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RELIGION AND SCIENCE

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ord religion, as commonly used, refers to complex insti-
s which are made up of many different elements. I am
much interested in the complex institutions which we
igions as I am in isolating from them the element which
us to call them religions. I am interested in the re-
attitude of mind rather than in religion as an insti-
. Similarly, in regard to science, I am interested in the
fic attitude of mind rather than in applied science. To
people the word science means applied science rather
he scientific attitude of mind.

eems to me that these two attitudes of mind, in their
ne forms, are very different and easily distinguishable.
speaking, of course, of a relatively late period of civili-
, not of relatively primitive civilizations in which the
ttitudes of mind had not yet become sharply differ-
ed. The religious attitude of mind tends to be emotional,
ive, subjective, and based on inward feeling or immedi-
xperience. The scientific attitude of mind tends to be
otional, rational, objective, and based on external obser-
ns. One tends to center around the unknown and mys-
s; the other tends to concentrate on what is known and
able in human terms. One aims at an other-worldly goal;
her aims to know this world.

eology is closely associated with religion. It has certain
blances to philosophy in that it tries to be logical and
al but, unlike philosophy, its premises are not entirely
Certain of its premises are not open and subject to criti-
and change, but are based ultimately on faith and intu-
and regarded as permanently authoritative. Theology
to build up a rational framework around religion, usually

around some particular religion, and is a rational defence religion. Interesting is the following remark of Averroes (b at Cordova in 1126), "Religion cannot be reduced to pro sitions and dogmas, but is a personal and inward power, tinct from the generalities of experimental science. Theol the mixture of the two, is a source of evil to both, fostering the one hand a false impression of the hostility between ligion and philosophy, and, on the other, corrupting relig by a pseudo-science."

A religious man does not need theology any more tha poet needs a theory of aesthetics or poetics.

Theology, properly speaking, is the theology of some p ticular religion such as Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism. It is colored by the nature of the faith found that particular religion, and tries to prove that this is the l logical and possible one.

Modern theology sometimes tries to generalize and to c with God as a general philosophical concept. This is theol detaching itself pretty far from religion and tending to bec philosophy. It is philosophy of religion rather than theol

Philosophy, like religion, tries to deal with such intangi as God, the nature of the universe and the destiny of man, to give answers to ultimate and universal questions, but, the other hand, having no fixed premises it has been draw away from religion and theology more and more and tend towards science. Today many scientists claim that the m significant philosophizing is being done by scientists.

Philosophy may end up by being chiefly occupied in bu ing up a rational framework around science, as theology bu up a rational framework around religion. It may have to g up the effort to reach finalities by means of pure logic a human reason. If I understand Kant correctly, his synthe judgments *a priori* are valid only within the realm of exp ence, are relative to human experience, and are of no value building up a metaphysical theory of things in themselv It may turn out that Kant will come to be considered the l great metaphysician, that metaphysics will end by prov merely the insufficiency of human reason to deal with finaliti

ɡārjuna, the great Buddhist philosopher, tried to do in
ond century A.D. Human reason may be a part of the
it is trying to prove and may not be able to transcend

ween the religious attitude of mind in its most extreme
and the scientific attitude of mind in its most extreme
here is a sliding scale, an overlapping, and a complicated
re of other attitudes. Man's attitude towards the uni-
is like a ray of light which breaks up into the overlapping
of the spectrum, with the religious attitude of mind at
id and the scientific attitude of mind at the other end.
ne will say that it is impossible to give any satisfactory
tion of religion, a formula which will describe adequately
e religions of the world. This may be true if religion is
as referring to all the various complicated religious insti-
is which the historian has to deal with as he traces the
n which the religious attitude of mind has worked itself
ı different countries. But I do think that it is possible
alyze out of these religious institutions that element in
because of which we call them all religions, and, so far
an see, this element is essentially the same in all of them.
ne anthropologists and sociologists have tried to define
on by describing the religion of some very primitive tribe
then defining religion by what they find there. Their
od is faulty because they delude themselves into thinking
what they are dealing with is really primitive. As a mat-
f fact it is primitive only in a relative sense. They are
ys dealing with a complex and highly developed insti-
n. The religious element must be analyzed out of the
ution. I do not believe that descriptions of the religion
imitive tribes and historical research can take us back to
re, unadulterated religion. They can give us only insti-
ns which contain mixtures of several different elements.
every religion we find the recognition of and preoccupation
non-human or superhuman forces or persons, with some
rhuman entity which survives the dissolution of the body,
some superhuman state which may be reached by man.
there is no absolute and fixed line of demarcation between

the human and the superhuman. The line changes from gene ation to generation, and things which once were regarded superhuman become understandable in human terms a are taken out of the domain of religion.

But philosophy and even science go so far as a recogniti of the superhuman and even of preoccupation with it, b as they try to push out farther and farther into the unknow they employ logical and unemotional intellectual methods, finer and finer methods of experimentation.

Science is like a variable approaching infinity. It has intellectual attitude which gets its ideas from outside, a builds up gradually towards universals.

Religion has an intuitive attitude. It gets its ideas fr inside and aims at immediate intuition of universals.

The thing does not become religion unless there is m than intellectual curiosity to know about the superhum unless there is a positive emotional effort to get into di contact with these superhuman forces and persons, and to re some superhuman state. At every level of religion there always been, in some way or other, a positive effort to tr scend the physical world.

This effort may be an internal, mystical, individual or may socialize itself and may express itself chiefly by o ward, external acts rather than by inward efforts. I do believe that the social group creates the religious attitude mind; rather the religious attitude is one of the several fact in the whole social situation, vague at first but differentiati itself out more and more in the higher civilizations. In a case, whether we consider the individual or a group of in viduals there is involved something of a mystical element, inward, emotional belief or faith. The religious attitude i volves something more than social organizations, ethical cod intellectual dogmas, and rites and ceremonies.

I do not believe that magic everywhere preceded religi and that magic represents logically a more primitive sta than religion. I am inclined to think that the two are equal early. Both aim at pretty much the same goal. The differen is a difference of attitude and method. Magic believes th

an do something to control these superhuman forces or s. Its method is mechanical and has a certain kinship he scientific attitude of mind. Religion tends to sub- te the human to the superhuman; not to know and con- but to appeal to it and to bring oneself into emotional t with it. Crystallizing around this religious attitude of we have:

The development of ritual; rites and ceremonies which are thought to please the gods and make them favorably disposed.

The formation of a priesthood. Certain men are believed to have greater capacity than others for coming into contact with and influencing the gods or for helping us to reach some superhuman state.

The development of creed and dogma and theology.

The belief that certain ways of acting are efficacious, please the gods, or help men to reach some superhuman state. These become religious codes of ethics.

e author of the article on Primitive Religion in the four- n edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica defines the ous attitude as "consisting in such manifestations of g, thought, and action in regard to the sacred as is held nduce to the welfare of the community or to that of indi- ls considered as members of the community."

e sacred is regarded as something mysterious, secret, owerful, there is an effort to associate oneself with this, n this effort there is an inwardness of intense feeling n gives to it a mystic character.

e thoughts and actions, as generalized into theology and ethics, vary greatly in different religions but the intense g which dominates the attitude of mind and gives it a ical character is the same in all religions and seems to be fundamental than the elements of thought and action.

ly an extreme form of behavioristic psychology would ude that feeling was produced by the performance of in acts, and it is impossible for me to believe that thought ded feeling.

I do not know where to draw the line in a minimum de
nition of religion.

If we define it merely as a reaching out to something beyo
man, an undifferentiated feeling, this definition will be t
narrow. It would be impossible to distinguish this from
similar reaching out on the part of science and philosoph
except on the basis of a difference in attitudes of mind and
the types of action connected with these.

If we define it as feeling plus the elements described abo
the definition will be too broad, since it would lead us to f
fledged institutions. To the historian, anthropologist, a
sociologist who are interested in the ways in which relig
has worked itself out practically in human life, the religi
institution is the important thing, but religious institu
are so different that religion cannot be described in term
institutions.

Historically, so far as I know, in every higher religion th
has been associated with this religious feeling one or more
the concepts of God or gods, of soul, and of future life. S
anthropologists have tried to prove that some very prim
tribes have no concept of gods, but their observations
conclusions have been challenged by other anthropolog
At any rate there would remain on the lowest levels the va
impersonal and mysterious *mana*, *orenda*, or whatever el
may be called. Even early Buddhism, which, although
accepted the popular gods as representing a stage higher t
human life, denied a creator God and denied soul as
fined in any animistic and materialistic way, had a dee
emotional other-worldly attitude which gave it its driv
religious force.

I do not know whether the concepts of gods, soul, and fut
life are an essential part of religious feeling or whether t
indicate the first vague rationalizations built up around
The very different ways in which these concepts have
veloped in different religions would seem to indicate that t
are later rationalizations.

So far as I can see there is no essential difference betw
folk-customs, laws, and religious codes except that in vari

and for various reasons some of these customs have
out under the administration of policemen and judges,
under the administration of the gods. They are man-
not god-given.

rality consists in adherence to some code, but I can see
solute standard of validity from which any code can be
red, unless one has a religious faith. It seems to me that
indus are nearer right than we are in looking at ethics
a relativistic point of view rather than in trying to base
some absolute revelation or command of a God or on
absolute system of metaphysics. As an Indian writer
es it, "A Hindu philosopher will place metaphysics first
thics afterwards. Morality has value only in so far as it
man for his ultimate destiny, on which metaphysics alone
row light. It has disciplinary value, but moral categories
more final than intellectual categories."

thics be not social in origin it must be based on the com-
of a God or on some metaphysical absolute such as "the
st good" or "the categorical imperative." In the latter
it will be claimed that it is based on reason and reason
e defined as consistency. But there are many different
stent sets of facts and it is doubtful whether the effort
iversalize these into one supreme consistency is reason-
The formal syllogism of logic contains some induction
n even greater amount of deduction. The positing of a
rsal goes beyond reason and is based ultimately on faith.
validity of the syllogism depends on the validity of the
al term and if this is so general and universal that it goes
nd human experience the syllogism breaks down since
ntains an element of mystical faith which cannot be prop-
controlled or universalized.

e religious attitude of mind, the intense preoccupation
and the effort to come into immediate personal contact
the superhuman and mysterious may react in various
.

some, this obsession by the superhuman may be so great,
xperience so vivid, that in comparison with it the world
practical human life may seem insignificant and valueless.

Such men will tend to abandon the world and to become oth worldly in their whole outlook on life.

This is a negative mysticism which leads to a complete pessimistic attitude towards this world as it is or may becor and centers all its attention on the attainment of an oth worldly goal.

To others, this preoccupation may be very great and t experience vivid enough to be of much significance in th lives, but they still feel that the world is very real and i portant, and that human life in it has great value and signi cance. They go on living their normal lives in more or less a social manner, but they make a concerted effort to bri something of the superhuman into human life and to ma human life approximate to their vision of the divine.

This is a positive mysticism which is optimistic about hum life and seeks to improve it through divine inspiration. I more interested in a practical application of religion to t world than it is to a personal salvation from this world, though that may be regarded as the ultimate goal of the ligious life.

There are also those who have never had, or think that t have never had, such vivid contacts with the superhum Their conduct is not dominated largely by a preoccupat with the superhuman, but they are interested. They beli those who have had or think that they have had such conta with the superhuman. They support them and follow m or less closely their teachings and imitate their way of livi Their religion becomes highly institutionalized. To this cl belong most of our church members and most of those in a country who are interested in religion. They are carried alo by the stream of an institution and personally have little ligious experience. They gain a certain emotional satisfacti from acting in certain ways and give casual credence to certa doctrines, but are not profoundly influenced in their da lives.

Others have had no such vivid personal contacts with t superhuman and do not believe that others have ever rea had them, and would treat them from the point of view

rmal psychology. They turn away entirely from preoccu-
n with the superhuman and unknown and think only in
an and social terms.

ligion is not all of human life. Like many other elements
ms only a part of human life. Rarely is it found so com-
ly demarcated as I have just described it. It comes in
es and is mixed with other elements. Men are more or
religious rather than entirely religious or entirely irre-
us. Religion has done as much harm as good in the world.
s like whisky or gunpowder. The goodness or badness
nds on the use which is made of it. I can see no other valid
rion than that of judging religion from a historical and
l point of view. To the completely unsocial man who
cts all of his efforts towards saving his soul, history and
ety have no meaning; the validity of his efforts can be
ed only by his own experience, and that is not accessible
nyone else, and cannot, at present, be measured by any
ntific methods. Unless we take as our standard for religion
mpletely unsocial point of view and judge its success by a
ation that does not depend at all on social values we must
ge the validity of religion from the way in which it has
uenced the social life of various peoples.

n all religious institutions we find constantly recurring
flicts of ancient tradition and later knowledge. One gener-
n lays down around the religious attitude of mind certain
mas and codes of action as universally true. Each
ndoned fortress of theology has been walled in by hundreds
onderous tomes of theology. These doctrines are accepted
true until criticized by later and broader knowledge and
erience of life. Then a new synthesis is made. But the un-
own, like a will-o'-the-wisp, always moves on ahead. Men
ve always followed it and probably will continue to do so,
in our modern world, as it is developing, there seems to be
ever diminishing place for a dogmatic religion which insists
every detail of a supposed revelation and on every detail
old traditional theological dogmas. The scientific attitude
mind and humanism are gradually rising around such static,
titutionalized religions and submerging them.

I dislike intensely the vague, shadowy, scholastic, aesthet humanism which has been built up around poetry, literatur and art. The scientist, who has a truly scientific attitude mind, in addition to his scientific technique, is as much a pa of true humanism as is the student of the humanities.

Are we not perpetuating a false vertical line of cleava between the humanities and the sciences? It seems to me th a better line of cleavage would be a horizontal one, and th science and the humanities and the social sciences ought to b able to meet on a common ground of humanism. Science h developed an enlarged humanism which has given us a great confidence in ourselves and our human powers, and a great reluctance to make an easy emotional appeal to somethi external to ourselves. The humanities and the social scienc are cluttered up with technicians just as science is clutter up with technicians. On both sides are many who do not ha imagination enough to rise above the tools of their professio who are not broadly tolerant and curious and critical of li and the universe as a whole but wrangle on a lower level techniques and help to perpetuate false vertical lines of cle age. Experts may be able to give adequate answers to questio of fact within their various fields, but most experts tend overrate the value of their specialties and to lose all sense proportion in dealing with life as a whole. There ought to b some way of combining the best elements of these branch of study into an enlarged humanism. A revivified philosophy of broader scope, and freed from the technicalities into whic it seems to have been drifting, might lead the way.

In every religion there is always more or less conflict betwee the institution itself and individual religion. Individuals o groups of individuals who have a deeply personal religiou attitude tend to burst out from the bounds of the institution H. L. Mencken, referring to the more intangible persona mystical elements in religion, remarks in his Treatise on th Gods, "The priests of all faiths naturally view such practice with suspicion, for they tend to discount the value of dogm and ritual and to make the devotee self-reliant and intrac table." Often institutions of a somewhat broader scope crystal

round these offshoots. It seems to be impossible to keep large mass of people on a steady course unless some sort institution with authoritative dogmas is built up around . The most difficult problem which religion faces is that aintaining a strongly religious attitude of mind without ing this to crystallize into static, over-dogmatic, authori- e institutions.

far I have not raised the question of the validity of the tific attitude of mind as compared to the validity of the ious attitude of mind. The religious attitude of mind is ntellectual and experimental. It is based on the idea of a t and immediate contact with absolute truths, either on part of the individual himself or on the part of some ancient het in whom one has faith.

oes direct experience put us into contact with ultimate ties, or are we building up a systematic delusion on the s of wishful thinking, merely projecting our fancies and tions and hopes outside and building up an ideal to which eality corresponds?

the first alternative is true, the only proof rests in the rience of the individual, and this is beyond the scope of nce or of a rational and logical philosophy.

the second alternative is true, these projected ideals may kept within reasonable limits by theology and philosophy made to be socially useful, made to fit into a progressive anism.

hilosophy has never paid enough attention to language, yet language should be carefully considered, since lan- ge is made up of words, and philosophy expresses itself means of words.

Do words contain only the meanings which we ourselves into them, or are there ultimate realities corresponding our words?

t is a common fallacy on the part of many theologians and losophers, and I suspect also on the part of many scientists, et up words and then to conclude that there must be some mate reality corresponding to the words. I suspect that re is still a considerable magical and mystical element in



our use of words, just as in ancient India it was thought th if one could find the right word one had control over the obje to which it corresponded.

Concerning the misuse of words Poincaré (The Foundatio of Science, p. 5) remarks, "The geometrical language is aft all only a language. Space is only a word that we have believ a thing. What is the origin of this word and of other word What do they hide? To ask this is permissible; to forbid would be, on the contrary, to be the dupe of words; it wou be to adore a metaphysical idol, like savage peoples who pr trate themselves before a statue of wood without daring take a look at what is within," and Dampier-Whetham History of Science, p. 207) says, "When we begin to fix means of words the abstract ideas thus formed, there is dan of error. Words should not be treated as adequate picture things; they are mere arbitrary signs for certain ideas — s chosen by historical accident and liable to change." Relig especially is prone to try to define things into existence.

The majority of people today are, and so far as I can the majority of people in the future will continue to be in ested in finalities (which lie outside the scope of pure scie and will continue to have more or less of an emotional attit towards them (that is to say, will have something of a religi attitude of mind), but if religion is to be progressive it m give up much of its old, absolute, theological dogma and mu of its old revelations. It will be necessary to keep religion mo fluid but at the same time to give it such cohesion as can gained, apparently, only by building up an institution arou it, and all institutions tend to become over-dogmatic an over-authoritative.

There is a tendency on the part of many to build up som sort of a logical framework of thought and then to try to f religion into this, lopping off such elements as will not fit, to build up a framework of social ethics and force religion int this. I am convinced that such thought structures and sy tems of social ethics are not the essential elements in religio These two tendencies exaggerate the elements of thought an action in religion and minimize the element of feeling. Th

l tendency, when carried to an extreme, is bound to result
behavioristic theory that feelings are produced mechani-
by the repetition of acts. I doubt if there are many who
cept this as the true explanation of the religious attitude
nd.

examples of this tendency to define religion in social
I may refer here to the theory of Durkheim and a school
nch sociologists that the religion of a people is a socializ-
the supramundane world on the analogy of its own
structure and is based on tribal consciousness, and that
s a creation of that consciousness as a hypostasis of itself;
statement of A. C. Watson that the common element
religion is a social attitude toward the non-human en-
ment and that the common element in the sciences is a
anical attitude toward the non-human environment; to
. Toy's definition, "Religion is man's attitude towards
niverse regarded as a social and ethical force; it is the
of social solidarity with objects regarded as powers and
nstitution of social relationships with them;" and to the
ment of A. S. Woodburne that "Religion interprets the
as a totality in terms of social relationships which are
a view to living with it in such a way as to secure satis-
n for the spiritual life."

ly the last of these definitions lays any emphasis upon
spiritual, but another statement of Woodburne, "The
ous attitude is one of evaluation, in which the subject
to appreciate or extract the meaning from phenomena
struments for human welfare," seems to interpret this
sed primarily on a sense of value rather than on feeling.
impossible for me to conceive of evaluation and appreci-
as constituting the primal and essential nature of the
ous attitude of mind. In the more highly developed
ons the element of value may be combined with the re-
s attitude of mind to prevent it from going to excesses.

r can I understand definitions of religion which would
it a matter of group psychology, as if a group generated
chology which was entirely different from any individual
hology. Social groups are made up of individuals. I do

not see how individual psychology can be cast aside entirely The group may result in an intensification of what is latent in the individual psychology.

If 'group psychology' is taken as a basis for religion thi seems to be understandable only as a reversion to some primi tive lowest common denominator, and this does not seem t be a very desirable basis for religion.

There is also the Heliotropism or Religion of Light of O. I Reiser, Philosophy and the Concepts of Modern Science, pp 188 ff. From this point of view religion rests entirely on physiological basis. Life originated physiologically throug the chemical action of light on matter, and the religious desi to 'see' and to find 'illumination' is merely a natural respons to natural stimulus, a continuation in physical memory of fact that human life originated in a response to light.

By the word mysticism, as I have been using it, I im primarily feeling and a sense of personal contact with mysterious and sacred. This, as such, has no intellectual c tent, just as in the Upanishads the efforts to suggest w Brahman is and to describe one's personal experience of Br man result in the three words *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda* (existe consciousness, and bliss). Judging historically from the v different concepts of God and soul and the very different so codes which have developed around this religious attitude mind these various concepts are not a part of the emotio experience itself but constructions, rationalizations wh have been built up around it.

Is this mystical element due merely to an intensity of fee ing, to strong emotion which is comparable to intense sexu feeling, or is it to be regarded as abnormal?

By many mysticism is regarded as a phenomenon which characteristic only of highly developed religions, or as a lat element in religion which emerges only when social institution break down. The former tendency exaggerates the importanc of the rational philosophical structure which has been buil up around the mystical attitude of mind and mistakes an effec for the cause. The latter tendency is part of the extreme soci interpretation of religion. It does not seem to me that thi

al element has to wait for society to break down before rges, although perhaps it will appear more widely when noothly running social institutions break down and luals are thrown more on themselves. If psychologically tical element is present in man's whole attitude towards niverse even in relatively primitive society it will not s itself for the first time at periods of social degeneration. uld be latent all the time. I doubt the interpretation of ism as entirely a waste product of social degeneration, ny of the positive sociologists would have us believe.

as I have suggested, the mystical attitude of mind is the ant element in religion, theology and sociology cannot d to build up rational and social frameworks into which n can be placed. That would be putting the cart before rse.

ne years ago an Indian writer sent me a large book in he tried to build up a structure into which he might put he called "Positive Religion." When I pointed out what ld to me to be obvious fallacies in his broad generalizations plied that if he felt as I felt when I thought as I thought would be left for him nothing but suicide. I cannot that the focussing of an intensity of feeling around intel- l dogmas is the proper function of religion.

n inclined to think that if religion is to maintain itself ital element in human life it must stand on its own feet nust base itself on the validity of the individual religious de of mind as a means of reaching ultimate truth without ding more and more on intellectual justifications and theories. Standing on its own feet it is impregnable. lidity is based on a faith gained by individual experience, his is a domain into which science cannot go at present nay never be able to go. It and science deal with different of the universe and have entirely different attitudes ds the universe. Neither can demolish the other. If e denies religion of this sort, science goes beyond its r scope, merely expresses a prejudice based on a vague ning from analogy. Science may properly be sceptical xpress doubt as to the validity of the religious attitude

of mind — but that is all it can properly do until it can furnish positive disproof.

I am puzzled by the attitude of some scientists who write about religion. They seem to be trying to save, out of the institutionalized form of religion to which they belong, or once belonged, something to which they give the name religion and which they think can be brought into correlation with science. As Eddington remarks, "A besetting sin of the scientific apologist for religion is to take some of its current expressions and after clearing away crudities of thought, to water down the meaning until little is left that could possibly be in opposition to science or to anything else — no one would be stirred to any great spiritual enthusiasm." Their statements are taken by many as having the whole weight of science behind them. Really they express only the personal prejudices of the scientist who is leaving his own technical field to talk about what he 'believes' rather than what he 'knows.'

It is not necessary for the scientific attitude of mind and the religious attitude of mind to overlap and come into conflict. It is possible for a scientist to have a rigidly scientific attitude of mind to the limits of scientific knowledge, and beyond that to have more or less of a religious attitude of mind, unless he adopts an attitude of scepticism about everything to which his scientific technique cannot be applied. The trouble comes when either attitude becomes dogmatic and claims universality for itself alone and denies all validity anywhere to the other.

There is, however, a bitter conflict between science and religion when an institutionalized and dogmatic religion claims full competency in fields which belong to science. It is useless to minimize that conflict.

In the book quoted above O. L. Reiser remarks that those who insist that there should be no conflict between religion and science because religion and science are not talking about the same thing are befogging the matter and throwing out a verbal smoke screen since religion and science are preaching to and studying the same organism and are talking about the same world. In a broad, general sense we are dealing with the

es of the same organism to the same universe, but the s and scientific attitudes towards this universe are so t and tend to concentrate upon such different parts of verse, if the things in which religion is interested do orm a part of the universe, that it is useless to try to ze the practical difference between them. Up to the science has not been able to explain the nature of the s attitude of mind or the parts of the universe with religion claims that it can deal.

n puzzled about the matter of intuition and the sub- element in science. Is science entirely experimental, e all its theories built up inductively through experi- Or does the creative scientist have intuitions or es,' as a scientific friend prefers to call them, which he roceeds to verify or to disprove? If so, there may be a psychological element comparable to that found in religious men. But the scientist would never think of 'hunches' about God and soul and future life, for he not proceed to verify or disprove them by any scientific d. All scientists with whom I have talked insist that is an essential difference between their so-called intu- and the intuitions of religion, that their intuitions are on a long process of experimentation and thought and he imagination involved has nothing analogous to the nal intuition of religion but is based on a reasoning by y. Poincaré (The Foundations of Science, p. 389) re- , "The intuition or illumination comes after uncon- work — but this has been preceded by a long process scious work and is followed by conscious work of proof erification. Sometimes these so-called scientific intu- are not correct, cannot be worked out." Faraday has ked that "The world little knows how many thoughts heories which have passed through the mind of a scien- nvestigator have been crushed in silence and secrecy by vn severe criticism and adverse examinations, that in ost successful instances not a tenth of the suggestions, pes, the wishes, the preliminary conclusions have been ed."

Religion jumps immediately to finalities which are su
jected to no test except an act of faith in one's own person
feeling or that of some ancient prophet who is taken as
authority. The scientific attitude of mind will not long acce
anything that rests merely on hearsay or authority and th
cannot be verified by any competent person, and is alwa
challenging even theories and doctrines which science its
has set up as working hypotheses. With its limited hypothes
science has a touch of agnosticism concerning finalities.
is content with working hypotheses and does not insist on abs
lute truth. Religion is sure of itself and of absolute truth a
the stubborn facts of the world must be *made* to conform.

Religions of an extremely other-worldly point of view, wh
ever they may have done for the souls of those who clai
have saved themselves, do not seem to have been very suc
ful from a practical social point of view. They seem to
inevitably to a stagnation of social life.

Should we give up other-worldliness entirely and tr
build up a pure humanism around science and philoso
based entirely on human values?

Vitalistic theories are losing ground. Psychology and p
ology seem to find little warrant for soul as an indepen
spiritual entity, and astronomy seems to find no place f
personal God and a heaven of the traditional sort.

The West is definitely turning away from a negative m
ticism and is turning more and more towards a pure humani
or a positive mysticism in which intellectual and social e
ments are as strong or stronger than the element of uncontroll
feeling.

If religion is to continue to play a vital part in the future
must do one of two things.

1. Accept humanism so far as humanism can go, disca
most of its traditional dogmas and revelations, and bui
religion on top of humanism, basing itself frankly on religio
experience accepted as valid for putting men into contact wi
ultimate realities, but must keep itself free from the develo
ment of too narrow dogmas. It is possible to know science a
to know philosophy and yet to keep all that is essential

n. Early Buddhism would have been perfectly at home
modern scientific West. But can such a balance be
between feeling, thought, and action as will allow the
tion of an institution which, without being too dogmatic,
ns enough of the emotional element to satisfy large
of people? If thought and social activity become com-
dominated by the emotional element they become so
mentalized that they cannot fulfil their proper functions.
Deny absolute validity to religious experience but accept
psychological fact of human nature, a wishful thinking,
jection of ideals which must be accepted as factors in
n life, and which may be made use of for social develop-
if it can be prevented from going to pathological excess,
mbining with it such other elements in human behavior
y make it a useful instrument for shaping social life. That
ay, its basis of validity would not be the individual experi-
but its workability in human terms. In human life it is
o important that a thing be absolutely true as that it be
ologically true. If it is believed to be true at particular
in particular places then it has power over human life.
enough to know that such immediate contacts with the
human are believed to have occurred and to rest upon
. As such they have exercised a very great influence on
n life and history.

any theologians are drifting towards a definition of re-
n in intellectual or social terms, but at the same time are
g to carry along mechanically old revelations and dogmas
sed on the religious experience of ancient prophets and
s who are believed to have been in actual contact with
nate realities — watering down their implications and
mizing their emotional elements until they become mere
n-words and slogans. Such men are riding two horses with
oot on each, and the horses are getting farther and farther
t.

eligion is not merely the focussing of an intensity of feeling
nd intellectual dogmas and social ethics. Its validity is
d ultimately on a faith gained by personal contact with
t is regarded as 'sacred,' and these spiritual values should

be kept within their proper sphere and not extended as ur
versally authoritative over the thoughts and actions of
men at all times and all places. The religious attitude of mi
is, properly speaking, an other-worldly attitude. If it allo
itself to extend its faith over intellectual and social dogm
which have grown up around it, so that it regards them
having absolute spiritual values it becomes a retarding for
which does more harm than good. Even if we deny absolu
validity to such religious experience we must accept this pr
jection of ideals as a factor in human life which may be ma
use of for social development.

HERAKLES AND THE GOSPELS

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recent article,[1] F. Pfister has put forth a theory which
rs to me so interesting a mixture of fruitful suggestion and
or as to repay a detailed and critical examination. It is
that [2] 'der Verfasser des Urevangeliums, das in verschie-
Fassungen den drei Synoptikern bekannt war, eine
ch-stoische Heraklesbiographie vor Augen hatte, und in
Abhängigkeit von dieser das Leben Jesu gestaltete.' This
sition he endeavors to support by a series of comparisons
en details of the life of Jesus as given in the Synoptic
ls and descriptions of the corresponding events in the life
rakles, especially as told by our later authorities, such as
rus Siculus and the so-called Apollodoros.

o not intend to go into the multiple questions of literary
sm which his position implies. The *Urevangelium* I think a
mistily hypothetical document, still more the 'different
ns' which it is supposed by Pfister to have assumed in the
space of time between the Crucifixion and the writing of
nonical Gospels, say a couple of generations. The steps
hich so Greek a performance as a life of Herakles could
got into the hands of the Evangelists, other than St. Luke,
y nothing of those of their presumed model and source,
would in all probability be a Palestinian Jew at that early
are not so obvious as to be assumed without demon-
on. But these and many other objections in detail which
be made I waive, and am willing to consider the story
y the Synoptists as if it were one document, late enough to
in a proportion of non-historical matter, Greek or other,
herefore to have been influenced by literary and philo-
c literature of the day. My point is rather that the parallels
by Pfister come nowhere near proving his case, and that
of them point in a different direction, not to a definite
ment or even an unwritten complex of tradition, but to
so prevalent at that time that it would have been a

[1] R.W., xxxiv (1937), 42–60. [2] Ibid., p. 59.

greater miracle than any the theologians postulate if th
had not influenced the biographers of Jesus or any other
markable figure in the religious life of the Empire or neighbor
countries.

By way of preface, I may be allowed to state my own view
the historical value of the Gospels. I think them a respecta
collection of authorities, by no means to be followed as litera
true in every detail, but containing a large core of fact and
accretion of fabulous material, such as one expects in the po
lar telling of facts, which is on the whole astonishingly sm
The facts which can be fairly deduced I suppose to be, briefly
follows; philosophical and theological interpretation of th
I deliberately leave on one side, as being quite irrelevant to
present purpose. Jesus was born, whether at Nazareth or B
lehem, at a date not very much earlier than the convent
beginning of the Christian era. His parents were Joseph
scribed repeatedly as a carpenter, and probably a master-w
man of respectable position in his own community, and his
Miriam or Mary. Jesus was the eldest of a family of at
seven,[4] the other members of which were not remark
though one of them, Jacob or James, acquired some reput
in the early Church.[5] The first three decades or so of J
own life passed quietly,[6] but when about thirty, appar
under the influence of John the Baptist, he embarked on
career of a wandering and unorthodox teacher. The impre
produced on his hearers was so marked that the idea grew
if not in his own mind certainly in those of his immediate foll
ers, that he was no other than the expected Messiah. This

[3] I have outlined my position in the Canadian Journal of Religious Thought (1
355–364.

[4] His sisters are mentioned in the plural, and the names of his four brothers g
Mk. 6, 3; Mt. 13, 56. To make them other than his full brothers and sisters is the m
special pleading, arising out of the later dogma of the perpetual virginity of Mary

[5] Besides the passages quoted in n. 4, see Gal. 1, 19.

[6] At least, nothing except the pretty and nowise impossible tale of the child
episode in the Temple (Lk. 2, 41 sqq.) has come down concerning this period. It
course clear that the indication of his age in Lk. 3, 23, ὡσεὶ ἐτῶν τριάκοντα, is not
pressed too closely; by Jewish and Greek ideas alike it was the age of bodily and m
maturity. But a like vagueness concerning the dates of nearly everyone not prom
in public and official life is notoriously common in antiquity.

ted without much difficulty by his enemies, the orthodox
em clergy, into a charge of sedition, and Pontius Pilate
ersuaded to order his crucifixion at a date variously
ed at from 29 to 33 A.D. For some reason no longer re-
ble, for it is hidden under the singularly beautiful legends
Resurrection and Ascension, the belief gained ground
e was not really dead at all, and from this beginning came
narkable spread and final triumph of Christianity.

t such a figure should have become the focal point, not
or theological speculation but for poetical and mythical
iation, is not in the least surprising. In a short time there
urrent stories to the effect that he was of divine parent-
ot the son of Joseph but of the national god, a miracle-
r (it is possible, indeed likely, that he really possessed
powers of faith-healing, efficacious especially in nervous
es and hysterical cases), and generally endowed with
natural characteristics which became especially apparent
his supposed death. The day has surely passed when it
he fashion to rationalize these legends away in various
w manners; it remains a fair question what source yielded
particular tales concerning him, and not some other,
y wonderful, series of fancies. Pfister's research is per-
legitimate in itself; my criticism is based solely on my
that the source he suggests is the wrong one.

begins his parallels with the accounts of the birth re-
vely of Jesus and Herakles. Here of course there is a re-
ance, both being represented as having supernatural
rs; but here the resemblance ends, so far as points of com-
n having any significance go. Pfister puts as parallel the
nstances that in both cases the human parents are natives,
least inhabitants, of the same place, Nazareth for the one
Mycenae for the other (as a matter of fact, Alkmene is
arly represented as being a native of Midea, while Mary is
ssociated with any other permanent residence than Naza-
; but it is hard to see how any such story could avoid
ing the husband and wife, or future wife, somewhere to-
r. His next point rests on a curious misreading of the texts.
ph,' he says, 'hält sich von Maria bis zur göttlichen

Empfängnis fern: Amphitryon hält sich von Alkmene bis z
göttlichen Empfängnis fern,' and cites, for the one, Mt. 1,
for the other, Apollodoros ii, 55, 57, 61. But the actual texts t
a different story. Joseph is married to Mary, but being assu
that she is supernaturally pregnant, leaves her untouched
after her delivery (ἕως οὗ ἔτεκεν υἱόν); Amphitryon is
married to Alkmene, who had been left in his charge by
father, till after the expedition against the Taphioi, and on
return marries her and finds shortly after that Zeus has b
beforehand with him. She bears twins, one to Zeus and
other to Amphitryon; Mary has one son. The real paralle
Joseph's conduct is not Amphitryon at all, but Oineus,[7] w
perceiving that Dionysos is paying court to Althaia, 'uolun
sua ex urbe excessit simulatque se sacra facere. at Liber
Althaea concubuit, ex qua nata est Deianira.' Like M
Althaia has but one child, the offspring of her divine co
Naturally, in the Jewish atmosphere of the Gospel narra
there is no question of any anthropomorphic relationship
that of either Zeus or Dionysos in the Greek stories; bu
miraculous impregnation takes place by immaterial m
ἐκ πνεύματος ἁγίου, Mt. 1, 18 and 20, cf. Lk. 1, 35, πνεῦμα
ἐπελεύσεται ἐπί σε καὶ δύναμις Ὑψίστου ἐπισκιάσει σοι. The id
by no means unparalleled. According to Plutarch,[8] the E
tians were of opinion that although no mortal man could b
lover of a goddess, it was possible for a god's πνεῦμα to 'd
near to a mortal woman and implant in her certain beginn
of birth,' which distinctly suggests the language of the T
Gospel. The whole matter is discussed at some length
Norden; [9] it is enough here to draw attention to the fact t
only in this delicate and quasi-philosophical form could
story have gained currency at all in the circles in which it
came in time an article of faith. But the main point is t
difference from the legend of the birth of Herakles; Joseph a
Oineus, being married, abstain from their wives because th
will not interfere with a divine process of generation; A
phitryon has no scruples of the sort, and indeed finds out o

[7] Hyginus, fab. 129.

[8] Numa 4, cf. quaest. conuiu. 718 b.

[9] Geburt des Kindes, 76 sqq.

cident that Zeus has been his rival; Mary and Althaia n consequence each one child, while Alkmene bears twins. eneral resemblance between one supernatural begetting nother is outweighed by the specific difference.

ter's third point, that both married pairs change their nce before the birth of the divine child, again is very unacing owing to difference of detail. Joseph and Mary go to ehem for a specific purpose, some months after Mary has ived, stay there till a little while after the birth of Jesus, hen proceed quietly to Jerusalem to perform the usual onies of the eighth day, whence they return to Nazareth 2, 21–39), or leave hurriedly to take refuge in Egypt from ersecution of Herod (Mt. 2, 13 sqq.). Amphitryon and ene, before their marriage and before the visitation of leave their native country because he is involved in a -feud,[10] take refuge in Thebes and live there permanently. entally, though of course a Stoic or Cynic biographer of ero could not be expected to know this, the whole episode ondary, a connecting link between the Tirynthian Herakles the Theban Alkaios who, at some unknown time, was ified with him. In consequence, the fact, which forms er's sixth point of comparison, that Herakles, though born ebes, is sometimes spoken of as Argive, while Jesus, though in Bethlehem, is on occasion called a Nazarene, falls to the nd. Herakles is a conflation of two persons, and consetly bears titles appropriate to both; Jesus is spoken of as a arene for the simple reason that he lived in Nazareth most is life. Even more trivial is the seventh parallelism, that s is called son of Joseph despite the story of his superral begetting, while Herakles is occasionally called son of phitryon, though his father is regularly said to have been s. Heroes with a divine father, if their mothers had mortal bands, regularly have just such a double patronymic; thus, sons of Molione by Poseidon are on occasion called sons of or, that being the name of their mother's husband.[11] In the pels, Jesus is represented as being called Joseph's son by

[10] Pseudo-Hesiod, Shield, 11, and many later passages.
[11] As Iliad, xxiii, 638, cf. Apollod., ii, 139.

those who have not heard of, or if they have do not believe
his divine parentage, e.g., Mt. 13, 55.

Passing now to the childhood and youth of both, Pfis
makes much of the persecutions to which both are subject
Jesus from Herod and Herakles from Hera. Again, the diff
ence of detail is great. The motives of the persecutors are v
different, for Herod is afraid for his throne, Hera is sim
jealous of her husband's illegitimate child, her usual attitude
such cases, paralleled for instance by her treatment of Apo
and Dionysos. Clearly, such a figure could not have been int
duced into the story of Jesus, since that was created in
atmosphere of strict monotheism. But not only are the moti
of the persecutors different; the intended victims react
quite different way. In the case of Herakles, serpents
miraculously sent to kill him, and he strangles them;
brother Iphiklos is apparently not molested, but only fright
by the visitation. No part of the story represents Jesus hi
as resisting Herod; his parents run away with him to Eg
Again, in one obscure version of the story of Herakles[1]
mother is so afraid of Hera that she at once exposes him,
while exposed he is found by Athena and Hera herself.
former goddess persuades Hera to suckle the child and
returns him to Alkmene. Nothing in the very least like
occurs in the legends connected with the birth of Jesus; a so
what less distant parallel is furnished by the infancy of Di
sos, who, like Jesus, is taken out of the way of Hera's jealo
by being entrusted to one nurse after another in various plac
or by that of Zeus, who is hidden in a distant country (Cre
from the murderous designs of Kronos.

Pfister is much happier when he looks in the legend of He
kles, as written by moralizing philosophers, for a parallel to t
Temptation. We may at once discount the difference arisi
from the unlikeness of Greek mythology, and consequent
Greek allegory, from that of post-Exilic Judaism; the form
had no devil, the latter had. Hence Herakles is not assailed
any definitely wicked power, for his countrymen believed
none. Generally, as in Prodikos' version of the story, preserv

[12] Diod. Sic., iv, 9, 6.

specially by Xenophon,[13] Pleasure and Virtue personified im and each puts forward her claims in a set speech; es chooses the latter. But there is another version, in Dion of Prusa and supposed to go back to nenes.[14] In this, the hero is led up, like Jesus, to the top gh mountain. But here the likeness ends, for he is not the kingdoms of the world from the mountain, but two ical groups of figures on it, one representing true kingship, her tyranny, and asked which he prefers; he chooses the . His conductor is Hermes, sent for the purpose by Zeus. semblance in detail is not very close, especially as Jesus is nted with three temptations, Herakles with one choice. , Herakles is quite young, just past boyhood, Jesus a e man, although just at the beginning of his active career. ver, a certain resemblance does exist, and needs explana- I would seek it in nothing more abstruse than the fact nyone who sets out upon an important line of action may ally be supposed to have thought it over beforehand and some kind of choice. This being so, it is an episode likely found in the biography of every person, real or imaginary, is represented as having undertaken some great task or rked upon a career beneficial to others, troublesome or erous to himself, or both. To say nothing of the several s of consultation before a noteworthy exploit which deco- ncient histories, I would call attention to the fact that the de of a deliberate choice, in which the chooser has the con- ences of his election more or less clearly revealed to him supernatural being, either before or after he has chosen, is a re of both Greek and Jewish tradition; classical examples Paris (success in love or success of a higher kind, in war or ship; the options are put before him by goddesses in both earlier and later forms of the story),[15] Achilles (short and

[13] Xenophon, Memor., ii, 1, 21 sqq.

[14] Dion Prus., orat. i, 65 sqq.

[15] The earlier form is in Iliad xxiv, 29–30, a passage absurdly misinterpreted or ex- d by editors. Paris 'railed upon the goddesses when they came into his courtyard ing, obviously, unspecified gifts of some kind) and praised her (presumably a natural being, perhaps Aphrodite) who gave him grievous desire' (μαχλοσύνην, ically lust felt by women; she gave him the power to arouse and control it as he

glorious life, if he kills Hektor, or if he goes to Troy; long but
glorious if he remains in Phthia),[16] and Solomon (wisdom rat
than long life, riches &c.).[17] Folktales of all lands of cou
make a feature of such episodes, told for their own sake rat
than as a detail of a biography; hence the material lay ready
biographers' hands, to be inserted with more or less moraliz
and more or less semblance of reality, according to tast
In the case of Jesus it is quite possible that the account we h
goes back ultimately to his own telling of a subjective exp
ence. We cannot, therefore, deduce influence of one biogra
upon another because both contain an episode of temptation
what comes to the same thing, choice between real and appa
goods, greater and lesser good, or the like, unless the re
blance is very close indeed, closer than in the case under co
eration, where, as already shown, the details differ not a l

As regards the activities of both in maturity, Pfister can l
forward only the vaguest and most general resemblance;
are represented as actively beneficent,[19] both suffer, both
submissive to the will of their divine fathers. The differ
are much more striking. Jesus leads the life of a wand
teacher, and is credited moreover with a number of mira
some of which are plainly folktales or stock wonderful epis
affixed to him as they might have been to anyone,[20] while ot
have the air of real events given something of the miracu
by the admiring manner of their telling.[21] He nowhere disp

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pleased, in other words to make any woman fall in love with him). The later, w
Homer does not seem to have heard of, is of course the famous *iudicium Paridis*
which he prefers Aphrodite to Hera and Athena, i.e., pleasure of love to kingship
prowess, — hardly wisdom at that early date.

[16] Iliad ix, 410 sqq.; xviii, 95–96.

[17] 1 Kings, 3, 5–14.

[18] See Stith Thompson, Motif-Index of Folk-Literature (FF Communicatio
Nos. 106–109, 116–117 = Indiana Univ. Studies Nos. 96–97, 100–101, 105–106, 1
112), J200–491, with notes there.

[19] Jesus *διῆλθεν εὐεργετῶν καὶ ἰώμενος πάντας, κτλ.*, Act. 10, 38; Herakles ἐκεί
(Zeus) *πειθόμενος περιῇει καθαίρων ἀδικίαν καὶ ἀνομίαν*, Epiktetos, dissert., ii, 16, 44.

[20] Such as the feeding of the five (or four) thousand, the incident of the tribu
money in the fish's mouth, and the walking on the water. See below.

[21] Notably the miracles of healing, as above mentioned; the miraculous draught
fishes, in the later version given by John, 21, 6, if this is not a rationalization of t

able physical strength, is celibate and of moderate appe-
never exaggeratedly ascetic,[22] and his travels are con-
his own country and the districts bordering on it.
is a huge eater and drinker, a great lover of women, a
r all over the known and unknown world, his wanderings
mited only by the geographical knowledge of his biogra-
and either literally a killer of monsters, human and
or else, in later and rationalizing accounts, such as we
postulate as influencing the Gospels if we postulate any,
htened conqueror and reformer, the type of the perfect
At best, he is allegorized, or takes the first steps towards
llegorized, into a reformer of the moral life of the indi-
I cannot think of any trace of a belief that he became,
re in antiquity, a spiritual king, head of a realm not of
rld. An example he was to many, in various aspects, as
l Cynic or Stoic besides the ideal king, but he remains an
ar of the good life in this world, and has little or nothing
ndental about him.[24]

er's attempt to find a trace of the miracle-worker in
es is remarkably unsuccessful. He adduces the return
ie expedition after the cattle of Geryon as told by Julian
ostate,[25] who rejects the voyage home in the cup of the
d declares that he walked on the water as on dry land,
ηρᾶς τῆς θαλάττης. But he forgets that we not only have
do with the suggested improvement on the legend of a
d rather fanciful author, but that Julian was brought up
hristian and was very well acquainted with the Old and
estaments. He may be actually transferring the miracle
walking on the Lake of Gennesaret from Jesus to Hera-
The many ramifications of the hero's legend agree in con-
the miraculous elements, once his divine begetting is

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tory, has nothing particularly miraculous about it, since anyone standing on
might be able to see a shoal of fish invisible to those in a boat at a lower level.
us ἦλθεν ἐσθίων καὶ πίνων, Mt. 11, 19, expressly contrasted with John the Bap-
eticism.

[22] On Prus., orat. i, 84, is a good instance.

[23] Cikt., diss., ii, 16. 45 (if you cannot rid the world of monsters, rid your own soul
ssions, and thus imitate Herakles and Theseus).

[24] Julian, orat. vii, 219 D.

allowed, to special interventions of Zeus or Athena in his fav
when he is in difficulties; he has no magical powers to eke o
his prodigious strength and courage.

Between the deaths of the two I can see no resemblance b
yond the fact that both are violent, and both victims show sor
natural shrinking from the end, overcome by heroic resolutio
An attempt (p. 54) by Pfister to show some resemblance l
tween the accompaniments in the external world of the t
events I cannot regard as happy. The Crucifixion is represent
as accompanied with darkness, earthquake and the appearan
of certain of the dead out of their graves; the nearest parallel
can find to this in the case of Herakles is some rantings of
pseudo-Senecan hero,[26] who says that similar things ough
come, now that he is dying. That both Deianeira and Juda
themselves is true, but not of very great moment; in both c
it is a natural incident, good fiction in the former and
parently fact in the latter. I cannot regard it as a close par
as Pfister (p. 53) does, that in the Fourth Gospel Jesus
τετέλεσται (Jn. 19, 30) at the moment of death, while the pse
Senecan Herakles says *peractum est* some time before his e
Pfister himself admits that convulsions of nature are somet
very like common form in describing a noteworthy death
morse for the terrible consequences of an action, however
meant (as Deianeira's was and Judas' has been interprete
being) is equally to be expected, and that when somethi
finished someone should remark that it is so is not extra
dinary. Such slight resemblances in the telling of two stor
both of which contain the tragic end of a great figure, are o
to be expected, and are more than outweighed by the ve
different atmospheres of the Crucifixion and the pyre of M
Oite.

The immediate consequences of the two deaths are again n
strikingly alike, considering that both contain the centr
feature of a revelation that the central figure has overcor

[26] Herc. Oet., 1131 sqq.; cf. 1595 sqq., where the chorus are puzzled to account
the thunder-clap which announces the ascension of the hero.

[27] Herc. Oet., 1472; Pfister does not notice, what is perhaps of some importance, t
in both cases the expression means that a fated or foretold end has been reached.

nd is immortal and glorified. Both, in the later accounts r deaths, die in the presence of their mothers and of rite follower (respectively the Beloved Disciple and etes), and the mother is taken care of, in one case by the son of Herakles, Hyllos, in the other by the disciple, who t been informally adopted.[28] It is worth noting, perhaps, neither case do these matters form any part of the l story. The Synoptic Gospels say nothing about Mary been at Calvary, indeed imply quite plainly that she t,[29] but the Fourth Gospel inserts her, and the incident disciple. Alkmene is brought in by pseudo-Seneca to e before the pyre of her son; from the point of view of terature and good taste the Evangelist is infinitely su- to the rhetorician here, and much more effective, by of his brevity and reticence. Neither these, therefore, e parallel, such as it is, of the last (Johannine) Word from oss and the *peractum est* of the Latin play can throw much n the sources of the Synoptic Gospels, whatever they o for those of the Fourth.

ch more important, and much more really alike, are the sion and the Harrowing of Hell. It is due to external stances that both follow the Crucifixion in the one case, in the other the Harrowing precedes the death of Hera- The hero's original legend had no Oite-scene, but made victorious over death by his sheer physical prowess; he ught Hades (or Geryon, or the dragon of the Hesperides; ree are variants of the one theme).[30] Hence the original les probably did not die at all, while the biographies of let them be under whatever literary influences we choose stulate, must allow for the historical fact of his having ut to death. His descent, therefore, into the lower world [31]

his seems to be the meaning of *ἰδού, ὁ υἱός σου* —*ἰδού, ἡ μήτηρ σου*, in Jn. 19, 26.

k. 15, 40–41 and Mt. 27, 56 give a list of names, not including St. Mary; 27 gives no names but implies that they were all from Jerusalem. Jn. 19, 25 Mary to the list.

e M. P. Nilsson in Nordisk Tidskrift för Vetenskap, Konst och Industri (1923), noan-Mycenaean Religion, 547: Rose, Handbook of Greek Mythology, 215, 216.

ere is no need to go into detail on this most interesting theme, which has been well and at length by J. Kroll in his excellent monograph Gott und Hölle er, 1932).

would come naturally after the Crucifixion and before th Resurrection, and its coloring took, with equal naturalness, Semitic tone, quite different from the adventures of Herakle though unconsciously echoing, in a faint and distant manne those of Ishtar. Little is left by way of a parallel beyond th central feature, that one and the other went to the world of th dead (or of the evil powers, or both) and emerged victorious.

There is a certain resemblance between the accounts of th two ascensions. The two Lucan descriptions [32] of Jesus' di appearance from earth say, in the one case, simply that h parted from the disciples and flew or rose up (ἀνεφέρετο) to th sky, the other that he rose from the ground before their ey and was hidden by a cloud. This certainly suggests Apollodo description of the disappearance of Herakles from the py except that his picturesque detail, thoroughly appropriate the son of the thunder-god, that a noise of thunder acc panied the miracle is absent from the Lucan account. Pseu Seneca also makes great play with the thunder-clap,[34] w by the way is reminiscent of the disappearance of Rom from Goat's Marsh.[35] There is, however, nothing at all in legend of Herakles parallel to the various epiphanies before Ascension.

By way of a postscript to his other parallels, Pfister dr attention to the similar ends of Mary and Alkmene. Accord to the legend, which can be traced to the fifth century A.D. a may of course be earlier,[36] the Apostles were carrying out Ma body for burial when angels came and took it away from the hence there is no tomb to her memory, but only a cenotap There is quite respectable authority for a like story abo Alkmene. Diodoros says briefly that she vanished and receiv τιμαὶ ἰσόθεοι at Thebes;[37] Antoninus Liberalis, who quot Pherekydes as his source,[38] is more explicit. When she died

[32] Lk. 24, 51; Acts 1, 9.
[33] Apollod., ii, 160.
[34] Herc. Oet., 1595 sqq.
[35] Livy, i, 16, 1; Ovid, fast., ii, 491 sqq., where see Frazer.
[36] References given by Pfister, p. 56 sq.
[37] Diod., iv, 58, 6.
[38] Ant. Lib., 33, 3–4.

se by the Elektran Gate, the Herakleidai started to
r; but Zeus was determined to send her to the Islands of
ssed and marry her to Rhadamanthys; wherefore
, at his bidding, stole her out of her coffin and sub-
a stone.[39] The Herakleidai, finding the coffin extraor-
heavy, investigated, took out the stone and set it up
holy place where her hero-shrine afterwards stood. In a
n legend which is certainly not very early, it is of course
ossible that a pagan story has been taken over with a
of names and places; it proves nothing for the Gospels. .
nk enough has been said to weaken Pfister's confident
nt that we may feel certain about (*mit Sicherheit be-*
) the essential truth of his theory. But purely negative
n is an unsatisfactory thing: *πᾶσι γάρ*, says Aristotle,[40]
ῦτο σύνηθες, μὴ πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ζήτησιν
πὸς τὸν τἀναντία λέγοντα. I wish now to discuss *τὸ πρᾶγμα*,
s or that critic's views of it. There are stories told
Jesus in the Gospels which bear a certain resemblance
o legends of Herakles or, I think rather oftener, to tales
r heroes or gods of non-Christian tradition. How may
explain, not so much the presence of these non-historical
ts, as their nature, the fact that they differ, on the one
from the no less picturesque accounts of such heroes of
l Testament as Elijah, and on the other from the puerili-
the Apocryphal Gospels and other documents dating
time when Christianity had had time to establish itself
velop a large mythology of its own?
much at least may be taken as certain, that the striking
of Jesus provoked speculation about his nature long be-
e theological theories of whose existence the proem of the
Gospel gives us the best-known early example. The
Marcan account,[41] copied by the other synoptics, informs

e legend seems to have started from an actual unwrought stone in the precinct
on; but it is worth noting that to use a stone as a substitute for a missing body
unknown in antiquity. For a grave containing just such a substitute, see
lvi (1936), 140.
ist., de caelo, 294[b]7 sqq.
c. 6, 14–17; cf. Mt. 14, 1–2, Lk. 9, 7–9 (here Herod cannot believe that he is
ne back again).

us that some took him to be a (new) prophet, inspired like one o the (old) prophets, those included in the Old Testament, som definitely held that he was no other than Elijah, come to intro duce the looked-for Messiah, and Herod had a theory that h was John the Baptist risen from the dead. Whether we tak this statement as historical or not for the date to which it refer during the lifetime of Jesus himself, there can be no doubt th it represents early and by no means regularized thought abo him; none of the suggestions is in agreement with Christia orthodoxy. Two of them make him out a more than huma person, a glorified spirit at least if not an entirely supernatu being. In contemporary Greek phraseology, all were agre that he was a θεῖος ἀνήρ of some kind. Seeing that the earl converts, once Christianity began to spread outside Palest and even some of those in the primitive community at Jerusa itself,[42] were under the influence of Greek, or Graeco-Ro civilization to some extent at least, it is fair to assume s knowledge of Greek terminology and habituation to Hellen (not classical Greek) ways of thought, though hardly en literary training or interest in Gentile philosophy for acqua ance with a philosophizing life of Herakles to be very prob We must, then, if we are to visualize the way in which the historical elements in the Gospels came into being, try to ourselves at the point of view of superficially Hellenized, particularly well educated or critical people of the first cent A.D.

Although we know far less about that epoch and its thou than we should like, considering its importance, this much see fairly clear. That a man should conceal under his human a pearance something of the nature of a god was a familiar id which took three forms, the first, as I see it, mostly a matter mythology and quasi-literary belief, the others taken mo seriously, one in the East and the other in the West.

That a god should temporarily disguise himself as a mort the false doctrine against which Plato protests in the Republic was an old enough idea, familiar in countless incidents of ep

[42] The Ἑλληνισταί, whatever exactly they were, of Acts 6, 1.

[43] Rep., 381 d sqq.

omer to Virgil and beyond, and from moral tales like Baucis and Philemon,[44] in which disguised deities come mankind to test their virtue and especially their hospi- Some simple folk were quite ready to believe it seriously, se Lykaonians who tried to worship Paul and Barna- but to the more philosophical and more skeptical disciple k philosophy, even in its popular forms, it was, I fancy, e than a literary figure, to express the presence of some- more than human, or at least normal human, power or s, as when Horace speculates on the possibility of us being really Hermes sent from heaven to cure the evils day.[46] More common, as a serious belief, especially in ion with royalty, was the semi-official or even entirely declaration that this or that prince was a Neos Dionysos like, in other words a new manifestation of the god in n. It does not appear that this was associated with any eas of how the manifestation was carried out; the result lieved in, but speculation as to the machinery which d it, if it existed at all, has not come down to us. I have ere tried to show that the deity of such a person might be d as a detachable thing capable of quitting him and behind nothing more than an ordinary human being.[47] her seems to be the case that such beliefs were taken ly in the East rather than the West; Antony might be os while he was posing as Pharaoh of Egypt by the side patra-Isis, but identification of anyone with a particular s opposed to the claim that he was vaguely divine, or way to become divine, seems to have been thought emy or madness by the average sane minds of the [3] Few, however, who believed in any sort of god or gods, have denied the abstract possibility that a man might in way have the makings of a god, or at least a *daimon*, in nd some believed fervently in such possibilities. It might

d, Met., viii, 623 sqq.
s 14, 11 sqq.
race, carm. i, 2, 41–44.
Liverpool Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology, xi, 25–30.
the ancient judgments of the claims of Menekrates Zeus, collected in eich, Menekrates-Zeus und Salmoneus (Stuttgart, Kohlhammer, 1933).

be held that this was the reverse to which Euhemerism was t
obverse; for Euhemeros had sought to lower the prestige of t
already damaged conventional gods by asserting that they we
nothing but men and women, distinguished in one way
another, and their cult a purely artificial thing, the produ
of statecraft or flattery,[49] whereas the belief, or theory, wi
which we are dealing was to the effect that perfectly genui
godhead had been achieved in the past by such beings
Dionysos or the Dioskuroi, who once were human, and mig
be achieved by contemporaries. A θεῖος ἀνήρ of one's own d
would be such a contemporary, and it was no flattery and
figure to expect to find him showing signs, in his life on earth,
superhuman characteristics. If we now examine the pate
non-historical events in the Gospels, i.e., those which, if w
to accept them as true, contradict all experience and all pr
bility derived from experience, we shall I think find that
simply correspond to the characteristics of a θεῖος ἀνήρ, an
may be taken, not as revealing the influence of this or
particular document, of Greek or any other origin, but me
what I suppose no one would deny, that the story of th
and teachings of Jesus was told in the first instance by pe
of no extraordinary abilities or more than very modest ed
tion, who therefore would be little likely to be superior t
ordinary presuppositions and prejudices of their own day.

The first characteristic of the θεῖος ἀνήρ, then, is that his
getting and birth should be out of the common. Quite a
from such elaborations of this idea as we find in the offi
account of the origins of a Pharaoh,[50] we meet with the t
modified to suit local and personal tastes, in connection w
prominent persons of all kinds. It is, of course, almost regu
for distinguished kings and emperors. The legend of Olymp
and the divine serpent, in its various forms, is so familiar as

[49] For a summary of the reactions to Euhemeros on the part of the large majo
who did not believe his theories, see R. de Block, Évhemère, son livre et sa doctr
pp. 70–71 (Mons, 1876). He is regarded by them as either an atheist or a liar.

[50] Described, among others, by A. Erman, Religion der Ägypter (Berlin, de Gruy
1934), 53 sqq. I do not go into the question what effect, if any, the docume
there quoted, couched in a language they could not read, may have had on
Egyptians.

lly worth quoting;[51] that a like story was told of the
of Augustus[52] and quite conceivably issued from his
of propaganda during the war, as a counter-blast to
's claims, is scarcely less known. But it is not confined
s; Aratos was the son of Asklepios, according to the
ans,[53] and some fancied that the piety of Scipio Afri-
naior towards Iuppiter was that of a literal son.[54] All
ere statesmen, and so those who were not royal might be
t to have been assimilated to the honors and peculiarities
lty. But philosophers were by no means outside the
f the belief. That Plato was the son of Apollo and not of
was a tale current in, or at all events shortly after,
own lifetime,[55] and Apollo again was declared to be the
of Pythagoras, how long after that sage's own times we
tell.[56] But at all events the former story shows how
such ideas might spring up, and that in the most en-
led community of Greece. Reputation for great wisdom
ot necessary to start it going, if only the subject was
ent in some way; to be noble and a great athlete was
, as we see from the quite circumstantial story of how
as of Rhodes was begotten of Hermes.[57] For a con-
rary of Jesus, of whom unfortunately we lack contem-
information, we may cite Apollonios of Tyana, who
ently was not only Proteus incarnate but was begotten
s and not of his mother's earthly husband.[58] And, to come
immediate environment of early Christianity, it certainly

example, Plut., Alex., 2, 3.

t., diu. Aug., 94, citing Asklepiades of Mendes.

usanias, ii, 10, 3.

ius Paris, epit. Valerii Maximi, i, 2, 2 (Valerius Maximus himself is lost at this nd Nepotianus omits the last clause): *Scipio Africanus non ante ad negotia el publica ibat quam in cella Iouis Capitolini moratus fuisset, et ideo Ioue genitus r.*

g. Laert., iii, 2, quoting Speusippos among others; cf. Origen, c. Cels. i, 37, tly says there was a tendency to tell such tales *περὶ ἀνδρὸς ὃν ἐνόμιζον μείζονα τῶν χοντα σοφίαν καὶ δύναμιν καὶ ἀπὸ κρειττόνων καὶ θειοτέρων σπερμάτων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀσεως τοῦ σώματος εἰληφέναι.*

mbl., de uit. Pyth., 5, citing 'a certain Samian poet.'

hol. Pind., 0.7, init.

ilostratos, uit. Apollon., i, 4–6, who adds however that Apollonios himself o such claim.

included some persons who were not born Jews, though th
may have been proselytes or σεβόμενοι, and therefore would
apt enough to mix such non-Jewish forms of thought with
expressions of the Old Testament [59] in which the nation or
king is called 'son' by Yahweh. Whatever the genuine Jew
thought of that age may have been, clearly the Christians of
first century were persuaded that the expected Messiah wa
be a son of Yahweh, in some sense or other, literal or me
phorical,[60] and represent Jews as sharing this opinion.

With all this to induce them, therefore, it would have be
very extraordinary thing if they had not represented Jesus
other than the son of two human parents. Precisely how old
legend of the Virgin Birth is, we have no means of know
but our evidence does not carry it back further than to a
when the one person who could have authoritatively co
dicted it, Mary herself, was in all probability dead.[61] I
already shown that the story as we have it differs from th
Herakles in an important particular; I add that in the
particular (the abstinence of Joseph until after his wife
livery) it agrees, not only with the conduct of the my
Oineus (see p. 116) but with that of Ariston before the bi
Plato (see passages quoted in note 55). So far, then, we
simply such telling of the story as would naturally be exp
of persons impressed by the known facts concerning Jesu
putting them into the forms of narrative familiar to them
the very atmosphere in which they lived.

With regard to the infancy and childhood of Jesus, the
remarkable thing, and the strongest argument against sup
ing any conscious ornamenting of the story from literary
other sources, is the paucity of detail. Matthew has
picturesque tale of the flight into Egypt and the massacre of

[59] As Ps. 2, 7; Hos. 11, 1.

[60] All three synoptics agree (Mk. 14, 61; Mt. 26, 63; Lk. 22, 70) in making the
priest, or the Sanhedrin generally, ask Jesus if he claims to be the Messiah and
τοῦ εὐλογητοῦ (τοῦ θεοῦ, Mt. and Lk., presumably as more easily intelligible).

[61] Since Jesus was certainly born earlier than the conventional 1 A.D., Mary
hardly have been less than about 20 by that year; this would make her at least 9
any probable date for Mark, and the story of the birth being in the two other synop
only, we have no indication that it existed till a later date still, i.e., till she was e
dead or in extreme old age.

nts,[62] which may be explained as sprung from a piece of
porary gossip, true or false, about Herod added to a wish
what he continually looks for, the literal fulfilment of a
cy.[63] Luke has the story of the Child among the Doctors,
does not seem to be folktale at all, but rather an account,
ess a little colored in the telling, of an actual incident.[64]
gree that persons of more than ordinary human wisdom
s, Eastern sages, old and holy devotees) foretold the
ess of the child before or after his birth.[65] This last, ex-
or the earnestness and genuine beauty of the telling, is
common form; for one instance out of many, we may
re the warning given by Nigidius Figulus to Octavian's
,[66] again a learned astrologer, like the Matthaean magi
heir star. I can see but one detail which suggests the
ry folklore of a wonder-child; Luke might be taken as
g, if no more,[67] that Jesus' mental and physical develop-

. 2, 13–23.

r the story of Herod, cf. Macrob., sat., ii, 4, 11: *cum audisset* (Augustus) *inter uos in Syria Herodes rex Iudaeorum intra bimatum iussit interfici filium quoque sum* &c. The words *intra bimatum* compared with the extraordinary detail δὺς καὶ κατωτέρω in Mt. 2, 16, when the rest of the narrative suggests that Jesus been but a few days old, strongly indicates that both are referring to the same . Macrobius gives no reason for Herod's murderous action; Matthew finds or a very good one, from the point of view of a folktale, that the king was trying to way with a dangerous rival. The prophecy is of course contained in Mt. 2, 15, terpreted out of Hos. 11, 1 (apparently the Hebrew text misquoted, for no in- could get it from the LXX).

I may quote my former article (see note 3), I still hold the view there expressed : Jesus shows, in the story in Lk. 2, 42–50, 'just such self-reliance and intelligent in the religion of his country as might be expected in a boy of genius and deep feeling. . . . The hero of a folktale would have found his way by some mysteri- dance to the Temple. . . . A wonder-child in a popular story would have con- ne doctors of the Law, or at least made it clear that he knew all they did and . . . To my mind, the tale cries aloud that it is a perfectly authentic happening.'

t. 1, 20–21; 2, 1 sqq.; Lk. 1, 24 sqq., 41 sqq.; 2, 8 sqq., 25 sqq.

uet., August., 94, where also other omens of the greatness of Augustus are told.

ory of the magi in Matthew is, as it stands, unintelligible, for it is impossible to at they are supposed to be guided by, since it is called a star, and yet behaves like nous body not many yards above the ground (v. 9). It seems possible that w had hold of a story to the effect that the magi discovered a royal nativity in vens (I am not aware whether any calculations have been made to see if there e at any date reasonably possible for the birth of Jesus) and so were led, not by a star but by what the stars had shown them, to visit Judaea.

k. 2, 40; but he had used very similar language, 1, 80, about John the Baptist.

ment was quicker than that of ordinary boys. But at most it a hint or an obscure indication of miraculously rapid growt in sharp contrast with the thick crowd of legends which su round the infancy, for example, of Apollo or Gautama Buddh or the miracles which the apocryphal Gospels insert into th account of his early days.

Coming to the ministry, we are not now concerned with t recorded discourses and parables, but solely with the miracl the credibility or otherwise of ascribing to Jesus the teachi which he is represented as giving depends, not on comparati study of popular ways of telling a story, but on our knowle and estimate of contemporary Jewish thought and Jesus' re tion to it. Nor is there much to say of the most characteris of the miracles, those of healing, for no more need be supp than that Jesus, like many men of strong and impressive per ality, could affect the minds of those whom he met, not lea neurotic persons or those hysterically simulating some dis If this be granted, a little very natural exaggeration and cr mentation in the telling of the stories will go far to accoun everything of this kind contained in the Gospels; it is sig cant that, according both to the Evangelists and his ow ported sayings, he attributed his success to the faith of t treated.[68] We may perhaps look a little more closely at story, that of the Gerasene demoniac.[69] This man was subje violent paroxysms of some kind, and so was regarded by neighbors, and presumably by Jesus himself, as dangerou possessed by malignant spirits. That the patient shared belief, as shown by his reply to the question what his name w is highly probable. What his exact ailment was it might hard be possible for the most expert modern physician to say, wi so scanty a report of the case available; we do not know wheth the cure was permanent or not, only that after the command

[68] As Mt. 13, 58 (but ibid., 17, 20 it is the operator, not the patient, who must h strong faith); Mk. 5, 34 (Mt. 9, 22, Lk. 8, 48). His cures cost him something in nerv energy, or whatever we like to term it; his own word for it is reported to have b δύναμις, or presumably its Aramaic equivalent, Lk. 8, 46; no one who has ever calme nervous person needs to be told what this means. More examples can be found by c sulting any concordance under 'faith,' 'unbelief' or their equivalents.

[69] Mk. 5, 1–16; Mt. 8, 28–34; Lk. 8, 26–37.

...posed demons to leave him he became quite sane and ... There probably are hundreds of men now alive and ...ng no extraordinary powers but simply a knowledge of ...atment of neuroses who have had very similar experiences ...r own practice,[70] to say nothing of the remarkable results ...id then obtained alike by faith-healers of a score of differ...ts and by the miracle-working shrines of various religions. ...then, that the treatment, if we may so name it, applied ...sus to this unfortunate man was as successful as the ...elists say, the popular explanation would inevitably ... He had had devils inside him, in the most literal mean... 'inside,' and when constrained by a power superior to ...own, they must have gone somewhere else in space. Being ...n, the most natural refuge would be the body of that ...l which is most unclean of all to a Jew, a pig, and a Jewish ...e-worker would presumably have no scruples about in...niencing so detestable a creature. Hence the picturesque ...on to the story, that they were allowed to go into the herd ...ine and triumphantly succeeded in drowning it. Hence ...he further detail, that the Gerasenes were at once anxious ...t rid of Jesus, as being too dangerous to have in their ...borhood, lest he should let more devils loose. This analysis ...pplies if it should be proved that the whole story is un...rical and Jesus was never in that region; there seem to ...been many other cases more or less similar, to judge from ...assages which state in general that he cured an undefined ...ber of demoniacs.[71]

...may then dismiss the miracles of healing as being most ... real events filtered through the popular mind in the telling ...o graced with a certain number of details taken from folk-... Passing to the other miracles, again a very striking

...f I may quote one personally known to me, a physician of my acquaintance, ... in the treatment of this sort of case, had had great difficulty in doing any good ...urotic woman, who had nothing organically wrong with her. At last he told her, ...ressively as he could, that she would feel relief at a certain time the next day and ...ards continue steadily to improve. She obeyed him to the letter. It is obvious ... tale of miracle or witchcraft could have been made of this in an age more igno... than ours of the functions of the nervous system and its diseases.

...As Mk. 1, 32–34.

feature is their small number. I take the list as given in an orthodox Evangelical source, not to be suspected of trying to reduce their number, and they amount to a bare half-dozen, even assuming that the passing through the hostile crowd at Nazareth [72] is meant to be a miracle, and not the bold and effective action of a determined and fearless man in face of a mob without a definite leader and perhaps uncomfortably conscious that their proposed action was none too legal. Two only are told in all the Gospels, and therefore may be assumed to have been so popular in the first century that no one could fail to associate them with Jesus. One is the feeding of the five (or four) thousand.[73] But of all the stories told of him this is the most obvious folktale. Multiplication of food is a regular incident in innumerable *märchen*. The hero is required to make a variety of dishes from one small bird; [74] he has a magic basket or cauldron from which an indefinite amount of food can be got; [75] there is some kind of food (often a specific kind, bread, cake, rice, cheese, chestnut, coconut, apple) which renews itself *ad infinitum*, or a kind of pill which, once taken, satisfies hunger for years.[76] Since a similar story was current in Hebrew tradition (Elijah and the widow's food supplies; later, he is given a few chupatties by an angel and needs no more food for forty, i.e., an indefinitely large, number of days),[77] this was probably the most likely to be attributed to anyone who had so caught the popular imagination as Jesus evidently did, and accordingly it was attributed to him. So far as I can now remember, it is not a feat ascribed to the heroes of classical tradition; we may therefore perhaps call it Jewish in this case.

[72] Lk. 4, 30. The author here does not indicate by a single word that he regarded the occurrence as a miracle, and to walk straight at a mob would be one of the most effective ways possible of daunting its members, each of whom would feel nervous about being the first to act.

[73] Mk. 6, 35 sqq., 8, 1 sqq.; Mt. 14, 14 sqq., 15, 32 sqq.; neither of these authors is conscious that the two stories are doublets one of the other, but Luke appears to be, for he gives only one account, 9, 12 sqq.

[74] Stith Thompson, H 1022.6, cf. 1022.5 (feeding an army from one measure of meal).

[75] Ibid., D 1472, which gives a long list of varieties of this theme (vessel of some sort, tree, palace, kitchen, table, table-cloth, pot, cauldron, kettle).

[76] Ibid., D 1652.1 sqq.

[77] 1 Kings 17, 11 sqq.; 19, 5 sqq.

Less well known, it would seem, for it is recorded only in the First Gospel, is the story of the fish with the stater in its mouth.[78] That this also is the product of folk-imagination is pretty clear, and this time we have something like it in Greek tradition, though with a different context, the ring of Polycrates, which made its way later into Christian mythology independently, so far as we know, of the story in the Gospel.[79] Fish are not particularly common as helpful animals, but they do occur, and a not unusual function of theirs is to fetch, in their mouths or otherwise, some valuable object which has been sunk in the sea. It hardly needs pointing out that in an age when navigation was so uncertain and perilous as it was in the first century the sea would be thought of, even more than in the age of Shakespere, as the repository of all manner of lost treasures, from which a mere stater could very easily be fetched, given some creature which knew where to look for it.

More definitely implying power over the forces of nature are the incidents of walking on the water and stilling the storm. The latter, like the miraculous feeding, is in all the Synoptic Gospels,[80] the former in two,[81] Luke perhaps feeling a little skeptical about it, as it would appear he is of two other tales which he presumably knew, the ones concerning the tribute-fish and the figtree. To walk on water implies one of two things, great speed (the person or object moves so quickly that it has no time to sink; possibly something like the children's pastime of 'skipping' stones may have helped to create this quaint notion), like the horses of Laomedon,[82] or else, more commonly, supernatural power which rises superior to the ordinary relations between solid and liquid bodies. The former is not implied in the Gospel story, the latter decidedly is; we can even see the

[78] Mt. 17, 27.

[79] Augustine, C. D. xxii, 8. For fish as helpful animals, see Stith Thompson, B 470, and for the bringing of the coin, B 107.4.

[80] Mk. 5, 37–41; Mt. 8, 26–27; Lk. 8, 23–25.

[81] Mk. 6, 47–52; Mt. 14, 24–35. As in both accounts the storm ceases as soon as Jesus enters the boat, it is fairly clear that this story is a development of the other, which perhaps moved Luke to omit it, as he did the other doublet, cf. note 73.

[82] Iliad, xx, 228–229, whence Verg., Aen., vii, 810–811. Iphiklos performs the parallel exploit (Iliad, ibid., 226–227, Verg., ibid., 808–809) of running over standing corn without breaking it, Hes. frag. 117 Rzach.

narrative growing and being improved upon in the not very lon interval which separates Matthew from Mark, for the forme adds the details that Peter was able to perform the same fea for a few moments, until he was frightened by the look of th storm, and that Jesus implied that anyone could do it who ha faith enough; indeed this, whether it was really taught b Jesus himself or not, certainly was a received explanation miraculous deeds in first-century Christianity.[83] Howeve water-walking in itself is fairly common in folklore,[84] and may again be regarded as having attached itself to Jesus fro no more recondite source than the imagination of his follower it is part of the repeated assertion that he had more than huma powers. Indeed, considering that it is a fairly common drea experience to find oneself moving over the most unlikely su faces with the greatest ease, it is not in the least remarkab that in the dream-world of *märchen* such things are said happen to imaginary persons, and so on occasion are predicat of real men and women whose impressiveness causes them to b credited with supernormal abilities. The stilling of the stor we need not linger over, since it is the sort of thing which th most ordinary witch or wizard of popular belief, then and many other ages, was thought able to do by the use of charm for a great man wholly dissociated from miracle-mongering ar much averse to it, yet credited with allied powers, we m instance Julius Caesar and the famous anecdote of his condu during the storm on the Adriatic.[85] The reasoning is t simplest and clearest, once the presuppositions are grante The gods, or God, can influence inanimate nature in all mann

[83] 1 Cor., 13, 2, a passage which, while of course earlier than the existing Gosp recalls the language of Mk. 11, 23 (Mt. 17, 20, Lk. 17, 6). But the idea is in no w exclusively Christian, cf. Virg., Aen., xi, 787, where the Hirpi Sorani perform their f walk *freti pietate*. The idea seems to be that the faithful follower of a divine power surrenders himself as to become simply a vehicle through which any manifestation that power's *mana* may show itself.

[84] References to sundry forms of it in Stith Thompson, D 2125. Except for the fo mentioned in note 82, this again seems to owe nothing to literary classical tradition, a therefore cannot safely be deduced from popular Greek philosophy.

[85] Lucan, Phars., v, 577 sqq., Plut., Caes., 38. The story plainly was half-way being told as a miracle, and probably would have gone the whole way if Caesar had c trived to get to Brundisium instead of being forced back to Dyrrachium.

ways, bringing for instance good or bad weather at pleasure; herefore men can occasionally do the same, if they can per-uade a superhuman power to help them by prayer or other gitimate means, compel him to do so by wizardry, or them-lves possess some portion of divine power, in other words are ῖοι. Nor need we spend time over the cursing of the barren gtree.[86] Any curse, though spoken by the humblest and least ῖος of mankind, may on occasion be effective; how much more, herefore, the curse of one the power of whose words was ontinually shown by his curing people when he merely told hem to recover, or bade the evil thing oppressing them to go way!

We may therefore pass to the events connected with and llowing the Passion. To begin with the prodigies said to have ccompanied the Crucifixion itself, it is to be remembered that esus was called a king by the title affixed to the cross and entenced, so far as the affair was formally legal at all, for pre-ending to that rank. Not long after the Synoptics were written, ome at least held that he had formally claimed kingship, but ot in any earthly sense.[87] Therefore it is only natural that vhat may be described as royal portents should surround his leath, and it is reasonable to look for parallels among the mar-vels said to have accompanied the departure of great kings and mperors. We have no great difficulty in finding them. Accord-ng to the Synoptics, during the whole time of the Crucifixion there was supernatural darkness; [88] to ask whether this corre-sponds to any real eclipse of the sun at a date historically possi-ble would take us too far from the subject of this paper, and it is enough to note that only Luke explains it as an eclipse, which in any case could not possibly last for three hours. It is more to the point to remember that wonders are felt to be proper accompaniments of such an event, and are even apt to be in-

[86] Mk. 11, 12 sqq.; Mt. 21, 18 sqq. It is the only pointless miracle related of Jesus, all the rest being marvelous feats intended to benefit someone. Again Luke passes it over in silence, perhaps for that reason.

[87] Jn. 18, 34–38, surely resting on something more than the author's imagination; such reports of interviews in their nature private are characteristics of popular accounts of important events.

[88] Mk. 15, 33; Mt. 27, 45; Lk. 23, 44.

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vented when they did not really occur. There was no eclipse visible in Italy when Julius Caesar was assassinated, or at any date within that year; yet Vergil most plainly implies that there was,[89] no doubt following some rumor which had had time to grow up in the few years (44 to not much after 37 B.C.) intervening between the event and his mention of it. Those who knew a little more astronomy contented themselves with something less sensational, a paleness of the sun not amounting to eclipse but portentous. If we assume, and surely everything we know about early Christianity justifies us in so assuming, that the death of Jesus was as portentous and horrifying to his first-century votaries as that of Caesar had been to most Italians about a hundred years earlier, we can see at once why both parties made much the same assumption about the convulsion the event must have occasioned in nature.

Another sphere where the death of a great and especially a royal person was expected to make itself felt was in a holy place of any kind, or among living things in some way holy. Thus the death of Caesar was portended by the conduct of the horses he had consecrated, who wept and would not eat.[90] The welcome end of Caligula was foretold, among other such omens, by no less an object than the statue of Zeus at Olympia, which scared away the workmen as they tried to take it down by bursting into loud laughter,[91] while the striking of temples by lightning is as regular here as elsewhere when something out of the common is to take place. The rending, therefore, of the veil of the temple at Jerusalem [92] at the moment of Jesus' death is exactly the sort of portent of which one would expect to hear for the general reasons given and at least two additional ones: firstly, that such a story would be very hard either to prove or disprove, and so has the character of folk-gossip already noted; and secondly that it is a symbolic omen (if the Holy of Holies is open, the temple is a temple no longer), and thus on all four

[89] Verg., Georg., i, 466–467 (*ille . . . extincto Caesare . . . caput obscura nitidum ferrugine texit*), plainly implying total eclipse at or soon after the murder. See, for the facts given in the text, Nettleship ad loc.

[90] Suet., Iulius, 81.

[91] Suet., C. Calig., 57.

[92] Mk. 15, 38; Mt. 27, 51; Lk. 23, 45.

ith the many symbolic events which formed much of the stock trade of ancient divination.[93]

Matthew, but no other synoptic, knows of yet a third portent, an earthquake which shook tombs open, so that πολλὰ σώματα τῶν κεκοιμημένων ἁγίων came to life and entered Jerusalem, where many (unnamed) persons saw them.[94] Once more we can see the process of growth in these picturesque fancies, which as usual are quite logical, granted their premises. There was a convulsion of nature, therefore the earth shook, *ergo* the graves were shaken open, *ergo* the abodes of the dead were exposed; not, as in the famous Homeric passage,[95] the underground home of all the dead and their ruler, but the particular τάφος αἰώνιος[96] of individual dead men, thought of vaguely as somehow living on in the places where their bodies had been put, a picture which has never left the fancy of mankind, down to the present day, despite the competition of more advanced and philosophical doctrines concerning the after-life. Consequently, there was an opportunity for the dead to come forth and mingle with the living; but it must have been the holy dead, for at such a time apparitions of the wicked ghosts would be most inappropriate. But in general, there is good ancient authority for saying that a notable death is attended or heralded by disturbances among the existing dead; one of the portents

[93] There is a certain superficial resemblance, but no more, as the significance of the two objects was totally different, in the alleged rending of Athena's robe mentioned by Philippides *ap.* Plut., Demetr., 12, cited by Wetstein in his notes on Mt. loc. cit.; the occasion was the profanation of the Parthenon during Demetrios Poliorketes' visit to Athens. The Christian commentators of course did not fail to allegorize the rending of the temple-veil, e.g., Chrysost., hom. in Matth., 88 (89), 1, 825d–826a Monfaucon: ἐσχίσθη δὲ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνυβρίζων εἰς τὸν ναόν . . . ἀλλ' ἀναξίους αὐτοὺς ἀποφαίνων καὶ ἐξ ἐκεῖ διατριβῆς . . . οὗ διὰ τοῦτο δὲ μόνον ταῦτα ἐγίνετο, ἀλλὰ καὶ προφητεία τῆς μελλούσης ἐρημίας τὸ συμβαῖνον. This is probably nearer what was supposed to be signified by the rending in the first century than Jerome's interpretation (comm. in Matth., 27, 51, 236e Vallarsi): *uelum templi scissum est et omnia legis sacramenta quae prius tegebantur prodita sunt atque ad gentium populum transierunt.* He cites, ibid., from one of the early apocrypha a further portent: *superliminare templi infinitae magnitudinis fractum esse atque diuisum.* This is but one instance, where many might be given, of the rarity of the incredible in the canonical Gospels as compared with later imaginings.

[94] Mt. 27, 53, adding that they did not appear till after the Resurrection.

[95] Iliad, xx, 61–65.

[96] For the lexicography of this phrase, see E. C. E. Owen in J. Th. S., xxxviii (1937), 248–250.

which Vespasian refused to take seriously was the opening o the Imperial tomb shortly before his last illness.[97] The sam omen, with the addition of a voice which summoned him, pre ceded the death of Nero.[98]

The story of the Resurrection is, of all the incidents in th traditional life of Jesus, the hardest to parallel, a fact whic much inclines me to believe that his disciples really had som very vivid subjective experience of a nature to convince then that he was still alive and powerful. Such incidents as th appearance of Apollonios of Tyana to the young man who di not believe in immortality [99] are extremely unsatisfactory illus trations of the vivid epiphanies in the concluding chapters o the Third Gospel, to say nothing of the moving narrative of th finding of the empty tomb, with the added wonders in Mt. 28 2–4, the frightening of the guard by an angel.[100] What reall happened to implant so strong a conviction in the minds o Jesus' followers so short a time after his death [101] is a questio which, if ever it is settled at all, is likely to be settled by psychologist and not a historian of religion; given the existence which cannot be doubted, of the belief at an early date, every thing else flows out of it in the most natural way. He was n dead, therefore he was not in the grave in which his body ha been put; therefore the grave was empty, therefore someon must have found it empty, and also there had been a miracl therefore a supernatural agency at work; and to people who ha *ex hypothesi*, no subordinate gods to postulate, the only possibl mechanism was the presence of angels. The Ascension al follows from the same assumption, and indeed is a much mo nearly commonplace story. If the skeptical capital could pr

[97] Suet., Vesp., 23.

[98] Suet., Nero, 46.

[99] Philostr., uit. Apoll., viii, 31.

[100] Again, if we compare Mk. 16, 4–7 and Lk. 24, 4 sqq., we can see the sto growing.

[101] I do not of course mean that the dates in the Gospels are to be taken at their fa value; but the Jerusalem church, which existed before the conversion of St. Pa (usually placed somewhere in the thirties of the century, see the comparative table Moffatt, Introduction to the Lit. of the N.T., 62–63), accepted the Resurrection, a therefore belief in it was general among Christians within a very few years of t Passion. Cf. 1 Cor., 15, 4–8.

ace a man who had seen, or said he had seen, Augustus flying
) to heaven [102] and even provide itself (presumably to impress
.e lower orders) with witnesses to the ascension of lesser mem-
:rs of the Imperial house,[103] it would be very remarkable if in
alestine no one could be found who, thoroughly believing in
.e superhuman nature of Jesus, did not persuade himself, as
ell as others, that he had seen him go back whence he came.
he details, as given in our authorities, are the most natural
sults possible of the inevitable attempt to form a mental
cture of what had happened.[104]

. Reviewing the whole evidence, then, we find no proof of the
fluence of any literary or popular philosophical source, such
a life of Herakles or anyone else, on the telling of the story,
ıt much showing that the popular methods of thought and
rms of imagination were active. To wish such things away,
r the sake of getting a more objective account of the facts,
ould be to wish the narrators either not human at all or so
ghly trained in the sifting of *Wahrheit* from *Dichtung* as to be-
ng neither to their country nor their age. As in our own time
would not be possible, except among the most ultra-compe-
nt specialists, to find any who could describe striking events
ıd the reactions of men and women to them without using
hraseology now current and showing the influence of such ideas
; 'complexes,' 'economic factors,' 'anti-social actions,' 'de-
ocracy,' 'Communism,' 'Fascism' and so forth, with their
tendant host of catch-words, so it would not have been
ossible, at that time and place, to find religious-minded persons
ho could either give or imagine an account of the most re-
arkable happenings of their own day without introducing
ich elements of folk-thought and folk-belief as those I have
ointed out. The impression made, on my mind at least, is
ıat we are dealing, both when we examine the existing Evange-

[102] Suet., Aug., 100.

[103] Seneca, Apocol., 1, 2.

[104] See note 32. It is perhaps worth while noting, with regard to the epiphanies
ich intervene between the Resurrection and Ascension in Luke, that they have at
mes something of the fluctuating inconsistent quality of dreams about them; in
c. 24, 36 sqq., Jesus appears unexpectedly, after the fashion of a ghost, and then pro-
eds to give proofs that he is a living man with a body of flesh and blood.

lists and when we try to reconstruct their sources, written o
oral, with thoroughly honest people, who told a story the
entirely believed with no more than a minimum of the distort
ing medium through which every narrator, according to his dat
and environment, must see the events which he tries to record

THE HIGHEST, HEAVEN, AEON, TIME, ETC., IN SEMITIC RELIGION

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The writer's interest has been much aroused by two important monographs appearing in this Review: (I) 'A Vision of Sandulis Aion,' by A. D. Nock (vol. xxviii, 53–104); and (I) 'The Gild of Zeus Hypsistos,' by C. Roberts, T. C. Skeat, A. D. Nock (xxix, 39–88). The evidence is of necessity predominantly drawn from Graeco-Roman sources, while the Oriental background or parallels figure less because of the lack of material.

(1) In re 'the Highest.' There has been long dispute over the origin of the divine title. Lidzbarski (Ephemeris, I, 251 f.), following Schürer, held that the cult of the Highest entered the pagan world via Judaism, dating the theme as later than that of Baal-of-the-Heavens, which would not have appeared until the 2d century B.C.; also he claimed that the Ἔλιουν καλούμενος Ὕψιστος of Philo of Byblos came by the same route. But in Eph. III, 122, he takes back the dating given to Baal-of-the-Heavens, in view of the discovery of the very name in Asarhaddon's treaty with Baal king of Tyre, and is inclined to agree with Jensen in deriving him from the Hittites. (This surrender of opinion by an eminent scholar is a lesson on the whole subject of priorities!) Our monograph II discusses the problem of Jewish influence, with the conclusion that it was 'not all-important' (pp. 64 ff., n.b. 67). The earliest inscriptions to Theos Hypsistos and Zeus Hypsistos are of date of the 1 century B.C. (pp. 60, 69); and the Greek, especially the Macedonian origin of Hypsistos is emphasized (passim, n.b. p. 60).

Fresh archaeological light is now thrown upon this divine title, which came to be modalized as a deity, from the oldest Aramaic inscription so far discovered, found at Sefīre (rather Khan Sūjīn) near Antioch. It presents the Aramaic form of the treaty imposed by Asshur-nirari VI upon Mata'il king of Arpad, and can be dated exactly by cross-reference to Assyrian

archives at 754 B.C.[1] Its preface contains an invocation of th deities in whose names the treaty is solemnized with drea imprecations. The list begins with a long series of Assyria deities, these then followed by the Syrian gods. The latte are headed by 'El, and the Highest (*'elyān*), and Heaven continued by a series of minor nature deities, Springs, Day Night, etc. It might look as if the Assyrian chancellery ma have divided the chief deity of the Syrian pantheon according t his attributes into so many persons and yet from early time this fractioning of a deity by his epithets is common in Semiti as in all religions.[2]

Now this Elyon is the same as Sanchuniathon's ''Ελιο called Hypsistos,' who is Father of Heaven. This Phoenicia authority's mythology, come down to us through Philo Byblos' hands, despite its complications, original and secon ary, is now accredited as of high traditional authority in vie of the evidence of the Ras Shamra tablets of probably th 15th century B.C.[3] This item from Phoenicia leads us bac to an equally early reference for the Semitic Hypsistos, o which has been obscured by the subjectivity of literary cri cism, and so appearing as dubious evidence to the casual st dent. This is Gen. 14, which has been dispatched critical as Priest Code by Gunkel in his Commentary (1901), as late addition to that code by Ball in Haupt's SBOT (189

[1] The text was first published by Ronzevalle in 1931, but in far better form by Weidner in Archiv f. Orientforschung VIII (1932), 17 ff.; cf. G. R. Driver, ib. 20 The text has been repeated in Zeits. f. d. Alttest. Wissensch. (1932), 178 ff.

[2] N.b. the Biblical 'Glory,' 'Face' (Presence — also Punic), 'Name' (e.g. 18:7; 30:27 — current in the Samaritan sect as replacing the divine Name): 'Wo (e.g. 1 Sam. 3:31; Wisdom, 18:15 ff.). For the common Judaistic use of 'the Pla see the writer's article in JBL 25 (1905), 17 ff. This Semitism went west and appe in Theophilus, Ad Autolycum, ii. 4, *θεὸς . . . ἔστι τόπος τῶν ὅλων, αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ τόπ* and in Arnobius, i. 31 '[Deus] locus rerum et spatium.' In the Samaritan liturgy t Deity is not only God of Tohu wa-Bohu, but also actually Tohu wa-Bohu, 'Cha (see the writer's The Samaritans, 214 f.). Such developments throw light upon 'G = Eternity,' see infra (3). It should be insisted upon that the 'Face-Person' (cf. the Person of J. Christ' at 2 Cor. 4:6) went west into the Christian theology, tra lated into *πρόσωπον*, *persona*, but not always retaining the Semitic flavor.

[3] Sanchuniathon discusses and criticizes the mythology of an earlier 'hierophan Thabion, who must have bequeathed his composition to posterity. It may be not merely as a matter of interest that R. Dussaud would assign one of the Ras Sham poems to this Thabion (Rev. de l'Hist. des Religions, CXI (1935), 8 f.).

hile Procksch more recently in his Commentary (1913) is r less positive, although he concludes with the comment, das literarische Alter der Malkisedekgestalt liegt schwerlich or dem Exil." And yet as for the Jerusalemite deity named that chapter Gunkel admitted that, "schliesslich wäre es öglich, dass er [the composer] noch eine Tradition kannte, onach in vorjahvistischer Zeit der Gott von Jerusalem 'el lyon hiess." Unfortunately suave literary criticism is often ken as of historical finality. We may compare the literary istory of Gen. 14 with the traditional 'chain' in Phoenicia, habion-Sanchuniathon-Philo-Eusebius.[4]

In this chapter, vv. 18, 19, 22, Melchizedek, 'king of Salem,' 'priest of God Most-High' ('ēl 'elyôn), which deity bears ne further title, 'Possessor of Heaven and Earth.' For the tter title, so translated in the English Versions, but in Moffatt's Bible and the Chicago Bible as 'Creator,' etc. I refer my note on a Ras Shamra phrase, where Asherat appears ith a title in a corresponding participial form in the feminine, *qnyt 'elm*, which I translate as 'Mistress of the Gods.'[5] We ave then in Gen. 14 the earliest instance, indeed very early vidence for 'the Lord of Heaven,' the Baal-shamem of a later ge, with his counterpart for the 15th century in a Lady of ne Gods.

(2) The third deity, or theological modalization, in the efire inscription is Heaven. This surrogate for Deity appears the Old Testament only in Aramaic Daniel, at 4:23; it curs in the New Testament (e.g. Luke 15:18, 21, etc.), and common in subsequent Jewish language.[6] This usage appears at first to be theological euphemism, but the term is now en to be ancient — perhaps unconsciously later readopted y the Jews, just as 'the Highest' came to be cultivated in ter Psalms, Ben Sira, Schechter's Zadokite Document. This odalization again has its counterpart in Sanchuniathon's deity ουρανός = Heb. שמי מרום (cf. אלהי מרום Mic. 6:6).

[4] For the point of view of current archaeology see, for example, W. F. Albright, he Archaeology of Palestine and the Bible (ed. 1, 1932), 140 ff.

[5] JAOS 53 (1933), 116. I may add that I had long surmised that *qônèh* here was uivalent, if not replacement of 'Baal,' itself originally an innocuous epithet.

[6] See Dalman, Worte Jesu, 179; Eng. tr. 217; my Comm. on Dan., ad loc.

He is the Ouranos of Sanchuniathon, brother of Earth, and the father is Hypsistos.

(3) In (I) Professor Nock has given a full survey of the them of the Aeons and the Aeon of Aeons. He omits however refe ence to the earliest use of the Semitic counterpart to the Gree *αἰών*, namely '*ôlām*, 'eternity.' As a divine attribute this ap pears in Gen. 21, where in the scene at Beer-sheba Abraha 'calls upon the name of YHWH, El-Olam' (v. 33), i.e. Go of Eternity. Along with Gen. 14 literary critics may be willin to admit that here too is an antique note. Reference on th side may be made to a Palestinian place-name appearing Shishak's list (926 B.C.), *bt 'rm*, transliterated by Burchar into Heb. *bêt 'ôlām*, 'House of Eternity.'[7] Professor W. Albright, upon inquiry, expresses his inclination to anoth interpretation, but does not deny the linguistic possibility this identification. However, at a much later date, as far evidence goes, we find an Oulamos deified in Sidonian traditio generally identified with our Olam — 'probably' to be so ide tified, cautiously says Professor Nock.[8] For this God of Etern Time we may go again to Sanchuniathon and probably fi him in the Kronos-Chronos figure who at the beginning of long theogony appears along with Ilus (El) as a son of Ouran For the actual, if not linguistically correct, process of Kron = Chronos I refer to the extensive article in Pauly-Wissow The proposed identification of Sanchuniathon's Kronos wi Olam is still speculative, but there is too great authority the Phoenician tradition to find in it merely a borrowing Greek modes; rather Sanchuniathon and Philo were adjusti Semitic modes to Greek dress.

As for 'the Aeon of Aeons' which Professor Nock continua cites from late Greek authors, it is to be observed that t phrase — whatever it may mean in Greek — has its Semi counterpart of perfectly correct Semitic idiom and significan For in addition to the frequent *olam* = *aion*, and so for th

[7] Burchardt, Fremdworte u. Eigennamen im Ägyptischen, no. 385.

[8] See pp. 86 f. for the reference to Eudemos of Rhodes, cited by Damascius, given by Z. S. Harris in the vocabulary of his Phoenician Grammar (1936); Conte La civilisation phénicienne (1926), 105. This deity is described as *ὁ νοητὸς νοῦς*, ' intelligible reason.'

lurals, we have one case in Semitic of the 2d century B.C. here the infinite future is expressed by 'unto aeon of aeons,' ven as the Greek literally and correctly translates the Aramaic f Dan. 17:18. This is not a borrowing from Greek gnostical anguage, for it is the expression for the unlimited future, nd further is of pure Semitic idiom, = 'utmost ages,' even s heaven-of-heavens means highest heaven, God-of-gods he Most Divine, indeed the Sole Divine. The Greek must ave taken the phrase over from the Semitic and then kab-alistically played with it. In the Semitic *olam* is always nlimited, infinite time, backward or forward, or for the whole xtent, 'from *olam* and to *olam*,' whereas Greek *aion* is a defi-ite period of time, like the Hebrew *dôr*, 'cycle.' Indeed in Biblical Hebrew the latter word was similarly and predomi-antly used in like syntax for the expression: *ledor dor*, *ledor wa-dor*, *middor dorim*, etc., and also in combination with the ord under study, *doroth 'olamim*, *ledoroth 'olam*. These Se-nitic superlatives mean *ad aeternitatem*.

The inquiry has long been mooted as to the relation of the patial and temporal significations of Aion (cf. I, pp. 89 ff.). he present writer has proposed a fresh etymology for *'olam*, hich makes it as of primarily temporal significance in origin.[9] he transfer to the spatial connotation, as of the aeons consti-uting worlds (so in Jewish language, e.g. Heb. 1:2; 3:11, and lso in Syriac) is secondary.[10] We have here an interesting

[9] JQR 25 (1934–5), 267 f. Reference may here be made to the obscure passage in cles. 3:11: "He [God] has set the *'olam* in their [men's] heart." "The Heb. vocable us been most variously translated: AV EV 'the world'; Am. RV 'eternity'; Moffatt, ystery': Chicago, 'ignorance.' So the doctors disagree. The most recent con-derable discussion is by A. H. McNeile in his Introduction to Ecclesiastes (1904), ff.; he accepts the view of Grimm, Nowack, Wildeboer, that we have here the *notio ternitatis*. One may compare another tantalizing phrase in earlier Scripture, at . 29:11, 'the vision of all,' i.e. 'of the universe' (?), as a divine gift to prophets. The rase at Acts 10:36, 'Lord of all' may be noted in comparison; it is a common Ara-aic (Palmyrene, Christian-Syriac) phrase for Deity.

[10] In regard to the moot question whether the Palmyrene *mārē 'ālam* (with the uivalent in Judaism and Islam) means 'Lord of the world,' or 'of eternity,' Cumont's dicious opinion may well be accepted that "the two ideas were inseparable in the ind of the Syrian priests, and a single expression embraced both" (Les religions ientales, note 73 to ch. v). I may also note a recent interesting volume, Time and s Mysteries (N. Y. Univ. Press, 1936), composed of chapters by Drs. Millikan, Mer-

early involution of the notions of space and time, anticipating modern astronomers.

The one extensive and philosophical discussion of time in Hebrew letters that I know of is that by J. Pedersen in his Israel (1926), 486 ff. To quote him (pp. 490 ff.): "history consists of *doroth*, each with their special stamp, but all the generations are fused into a great whole, wherein experiences are condensed. This concentrated time, into which all generations are fused, and from which they spring, is called eternity, *'olam*. Eternity is not the sum of all the individual periods . . . it is time without subdivision, that which lies behind it and which displays itself through all times." He notes also (p. 490) the passage of the temporal *dor*, 'generation,' into the specific, categorical sense, as in 'the generation of the righteous' (Ps. 112:2). There may be added the rather cryptic "God is in a righteous generation" (Ps. 14:5 — so literally). That is, the word was enlarging in scope, even as *'olam* passed over from time, a horizontal motion, into the celestial vertical observation, obtaining as it were a cubical notion of the universe. These citations from Pedersen are subsequent to the development of my own thought, and I am glad to cite his authority.

(4) Time in the person of Kronos has already been touched upon. Professor Nock discusses the relation of Aion as Time to the Persian Zervan (I, pp. 79 ff., n.b. 94). Indeed the old identification of Semitic (Heb.) *zaman*, 'time,' with Persian *zervan* is now surrendered by Semitic linguistic authorities who assign it a genuine Semitic origin.[11] I may here, as a mat-

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riam, Shapley, and the late Dr. Breasted — the latter's contribution being a reprint from the Scientific Monthly, Oct. 1935. Dr. Breasted notes the interrelation of the notions of time and space in ancient thought.

[11] E.g. Gesenius-Buhl, and Brockelmann, Lex. syriacum, 1928. These authorities connect *zaman* with Akk. *sīmān*. But with the widespread diffusion of the vocable in W. Semitic — Eth. *zaman*, Arab. *zamān*, there is no reason to suppose such a dubious etymology. The same word exists also in Aramaic (Syriac) in the form *zabnā*, with variation arising by labial dissimilation, a frequent phenomenon in Semitic. Arab. *zaman* is used technically of grammatical time, as Professor P. K. Hitti informs me the Arabic in its wealth has two other words also for time, while most languages possess but one. Interestingly enough absolute time, eternity are there expressed with *dahr*, which primarily means the same as Heb. *dor*, and doubtless is radically related to it. See also note 15 infra.

r of interest, call attention to an early document, which may : generally overlooked. In it Time appears as the potent lement of all existence, and so of human life and fortune. he document is the remarkable, I believe Pagan, Syriac pistle of Mar b. Serapion to his son Serapion, of the middle l the 2d century A.D.[12] The word 'time' (*zabnā*) appears con- antly, indeed as the chief theme, throughout the Epistle, it in Cureton's translation it is only towards the end that he cognizes the theme by capitalizing the word, 'Time'; the anslator in ANF has ignored this subtle point except in the olophon, where it is absolutely demanded.[13] Time is here ie potent factor in human destiny, a power to be borne and atiently suffered, just as in the Laws of the Nations of the irly contemporary Bardesanes it is against the similar notion Destiny that the writer argues. The colophon to the Epistle worth repeating for the gist of the composition as also for s brave mirth. "One of his friends asked Mara b. Serapion, hen he was in bonds at his side, 'On my life, Mara, I pray iee tell me what laughable thing has appeared to thee that iou laughedst?' Mara said to him, 'I was laughing at Time, ecause without having borrowed any evil from me, he repays .e.'" Noble Paganism!

(5) In II, p. 61, there is reference to the well known title of nnamed deities as θεοὶ ἐπήκοοι, 'Attentive Gods.' How old ie Greek phrase is I do not know. But it has its very ancient emitic parallels. The place-names Eshtaol (Josh. 15:33 — iddle of root 'to ask'), Eshtamoa (Josh. 15:50, etc. — middle root 'to hear'), have long been recognized, since Burney's planation, as oracle place-names. The full expression now pears in a gentilic personal name in the Ras Shamra tablets, -eshtemā'ī, the Il-eshtimaite, i.e. a name derived from the bode of a deity who is in Greek θεὸς ἐπήκοος.[14]

[12] First published by Cureton in his Specilegium Syriacum (1855), text and translation: translation in Ante-Nicene Fathers, VIII, 735 ff.

[13] Twice the Syriac word is pointed with the plural points as 'times' — by error the scribe? The meaning, however, remains mobile, e.g. "Do not murmur against y time."

[14] See Montgomery and Harris, Ras Shamra Mythological Texts (1935), 88. A milar usage probably appears in South Arabic.

(6) The Tyche, Fortune, of many a Syrian city is well known and its Semitic background in Gad the God of Luck has been recognized. He is named in Is. 65:11, in connection with the Lady of Fate, Meni. Gad now appears localized, as in the Greek cities, at an early age in a Ras Shamra tablet, 'by the Gad of Saphon' — the North, a place-name.[15]

The above offers some casual notes on Oriental parallels to Hellenistic religious thought and terminology, themselves ancient and original. The Orient contributed its native chemical elements, some new, some fusing, to the bizarre crucible of Graeco-Roman culture.

[15] Ibid. p. 93. For the Tyche of Jerash, Palmyra, Dura see Rostovtzeff, Caravan Cities (1932), Index, s.v. Meni of the Heb. = original Arab. fem. form *manay*, 'Fate' appearing in the Old Arabic poets, parallel to the ancient Arabian goddess Manā who appears also in the Nabataean. The Editor has called my attention to a monograph by W. Caskel, Das Schicksal in der altarab. Poesie (Morgenl. Texte u. Forschungen, I, 5, 1926). It contains extensive studies of *manay* and its fellow-forms, as of *zamān* and *dahr* noted above, and exhibits the dominant part of Fate in the Arabian thought. The distinguished Arabist Professor D. B. Macdonald has discovered and well expressed this native Semitic philosophy in his study of the book of Ecclesiastes in ch. v of his The Hebrew Philosophical Genius (Princeton, 1934). To quote him (p. 87): the Ecclesiast "was a Hebrew, working out from the already existent bases of Hebrew thought, looking with clear eyes at life and applying to it the acrid scepticism characteristic of the Arab mind." And in connection with the supra may be cited (ib.): "Ecclesiastes sees that the Universe is in Time itself. How Ecclesiastes would have defined Time we have no clue; but he had developed the particular 'time' of the Hebrews to this absolute conception, which is parallel to his passing from 'all things' to 'the All,' meaning the universe."

THE AMPHIBOLOUS TERMS IN ARISTOTLE, ARABIC PHILOSOPHY AND MAIMONIDES

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IN ARABIC philosophic texts, and following them also in Hebrew philosophic texts, restatements of Aristotle's distinction between 'equivocal' (ὁμώνυμα, *mushtarakah*) and 'univocal' (συνώνυμα, *mutawāṭi'ah*), terms [1] usually contain another type of term which stands midway between these two. It is called 'ambiguous' or 'amphibolous' (*mushakkikah*) terms. So far no adequate explanation as to the origin of this type of term has been advanced. In the latest and most important study of the subject, the problem of its origin has been left unsolved.[2] To solve this problem as well as to account for the various treatments of ambiguous terms in Arabic philosophy, including Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algazali, Averroes and Maimonides, is the purpose of this paper.

The solution of this problem is to be found in Aristotle's *Topics* and Alexander's commentary thereon. In one passage of the *Topics* (I, 15, 106a, 9), Aristotle distinguishes between terms which have many meanings (πολλαχῶς) and terms which have one meaning only (μοναχῶς), a distinction which evidently corresponds to his distinction in *Categories*, Ch. 1, between 'equivocal' and 'univocal' terms. In commenting upon those terms which Aristotle describes as having many meanings, Alexander remarks that they are also called 'equivocal' (ὁμώνυμα) and 'ambiguous' (ἀμφίβολα).[3] In another passage, a little later in the *Topics* (II, 3, 110b, 16–17), Aristotle further distinguishes within terms of many meanings between (*a*) those whose meanings differ by way of equivocalness (καθ' ὁμωνυμίαν) and (*b*) those whose meanings differ in some other way (κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον). Here again, commenting upon this passage, Alexander says that by terms which have many meanings 'in

[1] Categories, Ch. 1, 1a, 1–12.

[2] Cf. D. Z. Baneth, "La-Terminologiah ha-Pilosofit shel ha-Rambam," Tarbiz, VI (1935), 36–39.

[3] Alexander in Topica, ed. M. Wallies (1891), p. 97, ll. 22–23.

some other way' than 'by way of equivocalness' Aristotle means 'ambiguous terms' (ἀμφίβολα).[4] From these passages it is quite clear that Aristotle distinguishes a type of term which differs from 'equivocal' terms, on the one hand, and from 'univocal' terms, on the other, and that this intermediate class of terms is described by Alexander as 'ambiguous.'

Once we know that Aristotle himself distinguishes an intermediate type of term which is to be called 'ambiguous,' we shall now be able to find in Aristotle's own writings, with the aid of his Greek commentators, the origin of the various treatments of these intermediate terms in Arabic philosophy. We shall take as a starting point the treatment of ambiguous terms by Alfarabi,[5] and this we shall supplement as well as complement by statements drawn from the treatments of the same subject by Avicenna,[6] Algazali,[7] Averroes[8] and Maimonides.[9]

The description given by Alfarabi of ambiguous terms is that their application to two different things is according to the order of priority and posteriority. This description is the most prevalent in Arabic philosophy. It occurs in Avicenna, Algazali, Averroes, and, after them, in the Hebrew texts that happen to deal with ambiguous terms. The source of this description of ambiguous term is to be found in a passage of Aristotle's *De Anima* with Alexander's comment thereon. In *De Anima* I, 1, 402b, 6–8, Aristotle makes the statement that "if there is a different definition for each separate soul, as for horse and dog, man and god," then the term 'animal,' as the universal, is to be regarded "(*a*) either as nothing (οὐθέν) (*b*) or

[4] Ibid., p. 152, ll. 7–8. According to Alexander 'equivocal' refers to a 'term' (ὄνομα), whereas 'ambiguous' refers to a 'sentence' (λόγος). This phase of the distinction, however, plays no part in the Arabic texts to be dealt with in this paper.

[5] Risālat fī Jawābi Masā'il Su'il 'anhā, § 12, in F. Dieterici, Alfārābī's philosophische Abhandlungen: Arabic (1890), p. 88; German (1892), pp. 145–146.

[6] Najāt: I. Logic (ed. Rome, 1593), p. 23; (ed. Cairo, 1331/1913), p. 142; Shifā': I. Logic, quoted by I. Madkour in his L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe (1934), pp. 61–62.

[7] Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah: I. Logic, pp. 11–12, II. Metaphysics, p. 106 (Cairo, without date); Mi'yār al-'Ilm (Cairo, 1329/1911), p. 44.

[8] Original Arabic not extant. Hebrew translation: Kol Meleket Higgayon: Mabo (Riva di Trento, 1559), pp. 2b–3a; Latin translation from the Hebrew: Epitome i Libros Logicae Aristotelis, in Aristotelis Opera (Venice, 1574), Vol. I, Pars II², p. 36 I-M

[9] Millot ha-Higgayon, Ch. 13, ed. L. Roth (1935); Moreh Nebukim, I 56.

posterior (ὕστερον)." Upon this passage, Alexander in his *Quaestiones* makes the following comment: "If, says Aristotle, these things, namely, horse and dog and man and god, are not of the same genus and 'animal' therefore is not their common genus, then each of them has its own proper definition, with the result that the term 'animal,' which is predicated in common of all of them, (*a*) either does not signify any particular nature and is nothing but an equivoque, (*b*) or, if it does signify anything, is to be taken in the same sense as it is supposed to be in the case of those terms of many meanings (πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα) between which there is the distinction of the prior and the posterior (τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον)."[10] In this passage, then, Aristotle, as interpreted by Alexander, includes under πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα two types of terms, namely, (*a*) equivocal terms and (*b*) terms which apply to things according to priority and posteriority. Taking this passage together with the passage in the *Topics* where the two types of πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα are (*a*) equivocal terms and (*b*) ambiguous terms, we may conclude that ambiguous terms are terms which apply to things according to priority and posteriority.

This general description of ambiguous terms in Alfarabi is followed by three examples.

The first of these examples reads: "as substance (*jauhar*) and accident (*'arad*)." From parallel passages in Avicenna, Ghazali and others we may gather that what Alfarabi meant to say is that the term 'being' (*maujūd*) in its application to the terms 'substance' and 'accident' is an ambiguous term, inasmuch as it is applied priorily to substance and posteriorily to accident. The source of this illustration is to be found in Aristotle's discussions in the *Metaphysics* as to the relation of 'being' to the ten categories into which it is divided. The most characteristic passages are as follows: "The term 'being' (τὸ ὄν) bears many meanings (λέγεται πολλαχῶς), but they are all with reference to one, and to one certain nature, and not equivocally."[11] Alexander in his comment on this passage remarks that the term 'being' is between (μεταξύ) equivocal and

[10] Alexandri Scripta Minora, ed. I. Bruns (1892), p. 23, ll. 4–9.
[11] Metaphysics IV, 2, 1003a, 33–34.

univocal terms.[12] In another place Aristotle says still mor clearly that the term 'being' is used neither 'equivocally' (ὁμω νύμως) nor 'in the same sense' (ὡσαύτως);[13] by 'in the sam sense' he means here what he elsewhere describes as 'univo cally' (συνωνύμως).[14] These statements with regard to the in termediate position of the term 'being' between equivocal an univocal terms, or what Alexander would call for Aristotle a 'ambiguous' term, may be supplemented by other passages i which Aristotle speaks of 'being' as applying 'first' (πρώτως) t 'substance' and then to the other categories, i.e., accident The most characteristic passages on this point are the follow ing: "The term 'is' is predicable of all things, not however i the same sense, but of one sort of thing first and of othe next."[15] To what things it applies primarily is explained b him elsewhere: "While 'being' has all these senses, obvious that which is first is the 'what,' which indicates the substan of the thing."[16] And, again, "therefore that which is first an is simply (not 'is something') must be substance."[17]

The second example given by Alfarabi for ambiguous term reads: "as potentiality (*quwwah*) and actuality (*fi'l*)." Her too, as in the case of his first example, what Alfarabi means say is that the term 'being' in its application to the term 'potentiality' and 'actuality' is an ambiguous term, inasmu as it is applied to them according to priority and posteriorit The source of this example is again Aristotle. In one place, h says that "'being' and 'that which is,' in these cases we ha mentioned, sometimes means being potentially, and sometim being actually."[18] As to whether potentiality or actuality prior, we have different statements in Aristotle. Thus, in o place, he says: "potentiality is prior to that cause [i.e., th actual cause], and it is not necessary for everything potenti to be disposed that way [i.e., to be actual],"[19] and, in anoth

[12] Alexander in Metaphysica, ed. M. Hayduck (1891), p. 241, l. 8.

[13] Metaphysics VII, 4, 1030a, 34–35.

[14] Cf. the commentaries of Bonitz, Schwegler and Ross ad loc.

[15] Metaphysics VII, 4, 1030a, 21–22. On the terms 'first' and 'next' see belo nn. 27 and 28.

[16] Ibid. VII, 1, 1028a, 13–15.

[17] Ibid., 1028a, 30–31.

[18] Ibid. V, 7, 1017a, 35–b, 2.

[19] Ibid. III, 6, 1003a, 1–2.

ace, he says that "it is clear that actuality is prior to po-ntiality." [20]

A third example given by Alfarabi for ambiguous terms ds: "as prohibition and command." [21] A parallel passage Avicenna's *Najāt* states that an ambiguous term "is that ich applies to a thing and its contrary (*ḍidd*), such as the ms lawful and prohibited." [22] From this parallel passage of icenna, then, we gather that Alfarabi's example of 'prohibi-n and command' is not to be taken as an illustration of his n stated description of an ambiguous term as that which plies to things according to priority and posteriority, but her as an illustration of a new description, left by him un-ted, namely, that an ambiguous term is that which applies contraries. The example itself, as given by both Alfarabi and icenna, seems to be incomplete, just as the previous two ex-ples given by Alfarabi. The term 'law' evidently has to be plied here just as the term 'being' had to be supplied in previous two examples. What Alfarabi and Avicenna mean say is this: The term 'law' in its application to the con-ries 'prohibited' and 'lawful' (or 'commanded') is an illus-tion of this new description of ambiguous terms. So also in ilo's *De Fuga et Inventione* 18, § 95, and 19, § 100, the con-ries 'prohibition' (ἀπαγόρευσις) and 'command' (πρόσταξις) said to be subdivisions of the term 'legislative' (νομοθετική) 'laws' (νόμοι).

As the previous description and examples so also this new scription and example, I shall now try to show, can be traced Aristotle.

As for the description, it can be traced to that passage in the *pics* in which, as we have shown above, Aristotle, according the commentary of Alexander, differentiates between equiv-al and ambiguous terms. Aristotle enumerates four kinds such ambiguous terms. In the second of these four kinds, says that an ambiguous term is that which is applied to two

[20] Ibid. IX, 8, 1049b, 5.

[21] *al-nahy wal-amr.*

[22] The Cairo edition (p. 142, l. 13) has here: *al-ḥalīl wal-nāhil*, in which, from a com-son with Alfarabi, *al-nāhil* is evidently a corruption of *al-nāhī*. In the Rome edition 23, l. 7) the reading is *al-ḥāmil wal-bāhil, pregnant woman and unmarried woman.*

different things which lead to the same end, "as the science
contraries (ἐναντία) is said to be the same (for of contraries th
one is no more an end than the other)." [23] Neither Aristot
nor his commentator Alexander, however, uses here the e
ample given by both Alfarabi and Avicenna. Aristotle does n
give here any examples at all. Alexander gives three example
(1) medicine, which is the science of both health and diseas
(2) music, which is the science of both harmonized and u
harmonized sounds, (3) gymnastics, which is the science
both good bodily condition and bad bodily condition.[24]

But the example of 'law,' which is the science of both 't
prohibited' and 'the commanded' or 'lawful,' used here
Alfarabi and Avicenna, can be traced to another passage
Aristotle which occurs in the *Metaphysics*. In that passag
Aristotle discusses again the term 'being' and tries to show th
it is not an equivocal term but rather a term which Alexand
would call for him 'ambiguous.' In connection with this,
repeats the statement with regard to contraries which we ha
just quoted from the *Topics*. He says: "Every pair of co
traries is to be examined by one and the same science, and
each pair one term is the privation of the other." [25] This sta
ment leads him to the discussion of the contraries 'just' a
'unjust,' in the course of which discussion he defines the 'ju
as one who is "obedient to the laws (νόμοις)" and the 'unjust'
one who is "in some respect deficient" with reference to obe
ence to the laws.[26] It can be easily seen how Alfarabi's a
Avicenna's example of lawfulness and prohibition as an ill
tration of the ambiguity of terms when applied to contra
may have survived as a reminiscent phrase of Aristotle's
cussion of the 'just' and the 'unjust,' in the sense of obedie
and disobedience to the laws, in connection with his similar
cussion of the ambiguity of terms when applied to contra
When one recalls that the Greek word for law used by Aristo
in this passage, namely, *νόμος*, has been adopted into Ara
where it became *nāmūs*, and is used there in the same se

[23] Topics II, 3, 110b, 19–21.
[24] Alexander in Topica, p. 152, ll. 19–20.
[25] Metaphysics XI, 3, 1061a, 18–20.
[26] Ibid., 25–27

e connection between Alfarabi's and Avicenna's example and e passage in Aristotle becomes still more evident.

As correlated with the distinction of 'priority' (*taqaddum*, *ότερον*) and 'posteriority' (*ta'akhkhur*, *ὕστερον*) already mened by Alfarabi and illustrated by the example of the term eing' in its application to substance and accident, Algazali his *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*, p. 44, mentions also two other similar stinctions. First, the distinction of 'primary' or 'first' *wwaliyy*) and 'subsequent' or 'next' (*ākhiriyy*), which he lustrates again by the example of 'being' in its application to thing to which it belongs essentially (*min dhātihi*) and to a ing to which it belongs by reason of something else (*min airihi*). Second, the distinction of 'intensity' (*shiddah*) and ightness' (*ḍa'f*), which he illustrates by the example of the rm 'whiteness' in its application to 'ivory' (*'āj*) and a 'crown' *ij*). Now these two new kinds of distinctions can also be ced to Aristotle. With regard to the first distinction, Alga-li's phrase 'primary and subsequent' (*al-awwaliyy wal-hiriyy*) reflects the contrasting Greek words *πρώτως* and *ομένως*. Furthermore, the example used by Algazali to illus-te these two terms reflects Aristotle's statement that the m 'first' or 'primary' (*πρῶτος*) applies to things to which eing' belongs essentially (*καθ' αὐτό*) as distinguished from ings to which it belongs in virtue of something else (*κατ' λο*),[27] in the latter case of which he could probably also say at 'being' belongs to those things 'next' or 'subsequently' *τομένως*), for in another place he says that 'being' is predicated st' (*πρώτως*) of one sort of thing, i.e., substance, and 'next' *τομένως*) of others, i.e., accidents.[28] With regard to the sec-d distinction, Algazali's phrase 'intensity and slightness' (*al-iddah wal-ḍa'f*) literally reflects the contrasting Greek terms *σόδρα* and *ἠρέμα* which occur often in Aristotle.[29] But from the t that Algazali uses it here with reference to some difference th which the term 'whiteness' is applied to different white ngs it may be inferred that it reflects the Greek phrase 'more

[7] Metaphysics VII, 6, 1031b, 13–14.

[8] Ibid. VII, 4, 1030a, 21–22.

[9] Cf., e.g., Topics III, 2, 117b, 23, and see Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, s.v.

and less' (*τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον*) which is often used by Aristot in a similar connection as, e.g., in his statement that "one thin is said to be more (*μᾶλλον*) or less (*ἧττον*) white than another." The changing by Algazali, or by somebody else before him, Aristotle's original phrase 'more or less' into 'intensity slightness' may at first sight seem to be purely accidental, f the two phrases are sometimes used by Aristotle himself in th same sense.[31] Furthermore, a similar change of terms also o curs in Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's *Categori* where the term 'more' (*akthar*), which is used in the Arab translation of Aristotle's text as the literal translation of th Greek *μᾶλλον*, is changed to the term 'more intense' (*ashadd*) But later, when I shall take up the question whether Aristot would call 'whiteness' in its application to different white thin an 'ambiguous' term, I hope to show that the change of th phrase 'more or less' to 'intensity or slightness' in this partic lar instance was made for a definite purpose.[33]

In the same place in his *Miʿyār al-ʿIlm*, Algazali adds a s of three other examples to illustrate the use of ambiguo terms. (1) A term which applies to different things by virt of their proceeding from one beginning, as, e.g., the ter 'medical' (*ṭibbiyy*) in its application to (*a*) a book (*kitāb*), (*b*) small knife (*mibḍaʿ*), and (*c*) a drug (*dawāʾ*). (2) A term wh applies to different things by virtue of their conducting to o end, as, e.g., the term 'healthy' (*ṣiḥḥiyy*) in its application to a drug (*dawāʾ*), (*b*) gymnastics (*riyāḍah*), and (3) venesecti (*faṣd*). (3) A term which applies to different things by virt of their having both one beginning and one end, as, e.g., t application of the term 'divine' (*ilāhiyyah*) to all things. Th passage has been traced to Porphyry,[34] who in his reclassific tion of Aristotle's equivocal terms places under what he ca 'equivocal in meaning' (*ὁμώνυμος ἀπὸ διανοίας*), (1) terms a plied to things proceeding from one source (*ἀφ' ἑνός*), such, e.

[30] Categories, Ch. 8, 10b, 26.

[31] Cf. Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, sub *μᾶλλον*.

[32] Cf. M. Bouyges, Averroes: Talkhiç Kitāb al-Maqoūlat (1932), p. 32, l. 138 Aristotle's Text and p. 33, l. 1 of Averroes' Commentary; also p. 84, l. 458 of Text a l. 4 of Commentary.

[33] Cf. below, p. 167.

[34] Cf. Baneth, op. cit., p. 37.

the application of the term 'medical' (ἰατρικός) to (*a*) medi-
l book (βιβλίον ἰατρικόν), (*b*) a drug (φάρμακον), (*c*) a small
ife (σμιλίον), and (2) terms applied to different things lead-
g to one end (πρὸς ἕν), such, e.g., as the application of the
rm 'healthy' (ὑγιεινόν) to (*a*) grain (σιτίον), (*b*) walking
ερίπατος) and (*c*) a [hygienic] lecture (ἀνάγνωσμα).[35] Now
ere is no doubt that part of Algazali's passage is based upon
at of Porphyry, but still Porphyry's passage by itself would
t account for the peculiar fact that Algazali makes use of
ese examples as illustrations of ambiguous terms, nor would it
plain how Algazali, or whoever was responsible for it, hap-
ned to introduce the term 'venesection' which does not occur
Porphyry's passage. In order to be able to account for this
rticular use made by him of these examples as well as for his
e of the term 'venesection,' we must turn again to Aristotle
d Alexander, for most of the examples used by Porphyry and
gazali occur also, though in different form, in that passage
the *Topics* where Aristotle discusses what Alexander calls
r him ambiguous term. In Aristotle they occur under the
st of the four kinds of ambiguous terms enumerated by him
ere. It is described by him as a term which is applied to dif-
ent things of which one is an end and the other is a means to
at end. Aristotle illustrates it by the example of the term
edical' in its application both to the science of producing
alth (ὑγίειαν ποιῆσαι) and to the science of prescribing diet
αιτῆσαι).[36] Alexander illustrates it by the term 'medical' in
application to health and to those things which produce
alth, such as diet (δίαιτα), cutting (τομή) and cautery (καῦ-
).[37] Now, the term τομή, which means 'cutting' in any kind
surgical operation, may have been taken by some Arabic
der or translator of Alexander in the special sense of 'cutting
vein' (φλεβοτομία) and hence Algazali's 'venesection.' Fur-
ermore, in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle uses the term 'medical'
an illustration not only of its application to different things
virtue of their leading to one end but also of its application to

[35] Porphyrius in Categorias, ed. A. Busse (1897), p. 66, ll. 2 ff.
[36] Topics II, 3, 110b, 17–19.
[37] Alexander in Topica, p. 152, ll. 16–17.

different things by virtue, as he says elsewhere, of their proceed ing from one source (*ἀφ' ἑνός*).[38] He thus says that the ter 'medical' applies both to a [medical] discourse (*λόγος*) and to small knife (*μαχαίριον*) on the ground that "the former proceed from medical science (*ἀπὸ τῆς ἰατρικῆς*), and the latter is usefu to it."[39] Finally, Simplicius, in his commentary on the *Cate gories*, states definitely that terms applied to things proceed ing from one source (*ἀφ' ἑνός*) or leading to one end (*πρὸς ἕν* are neither equivocal nor univocal[40] but that they are inte mediate (*τὸ μέσον*) between equivocal and univocal.[41] In shor they are ambiguous terms.

A further extension of the use of 'ambiguous' terms is to b found in Averroes' Epitome of Porphyry's *Isagoge*.[42] Definin an 'ambiguous'[43] term as that which is applied to differen things which are related to one source, as, e.g., one agent,[44] or to one end[45] or to one subject,[46] he divides it into two mai divisions of which the first has two subdivisions and the secon four subdivisions, as follows:[47]

[38] Nicomachean Ethics I, 6, 1096b, 27–28.

[39] Metaphysics XI, 3, 1061a, 3–5.

[40] Simplicius in Categorias, ed. C. Kalbfleisch (1907), p. 74, ll. 30–31.

[41] Ibid., p. 228, l. 9. Here Simplicius mentions only *ἀφ' ἑνός*.

[42] Cf. above, n. 8.

[43] *nomina analoga* (p. 36 L). In the Hebrew version: שמות מסופקים (p. 3a), i *nomina ambigua*. On the use of *analoga* for *ambigua*, see below n. 84.

[44] אל התחלה אחת, כמו שיוחס אל פועל אחד, ad principium unum: sicut si com rentur, *ad efficiens unum*. This reflects Aristotle's interpretation of *ἀρχή* as an effic cause in Metaphysics VI, 1, 1013a, 7–10.

[45] אל תכליה אחת, *ad finem unum*.

[46] *ad subjectum unum*. In the Hebrew version: אל מקום אחד, i.e., *ad locum unu* The Hebrew מקום seems to reflect here the Arabic *maḥall* rather than the Arabic *mak* and hence the Latin *subjectum*. The Arabic *maḥall* in Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah: II. Me physics, p. 80, is translated into Hebrew by משכן, i.e., מקום (Kawwanot ha-Pilosofi MS. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Cod. Heb. 901), and into Latin by *subjectum* (. gazel's Metaphysics, ed. J. T. Muckle (1933), p. 6, l. 8). Cf. my Crescas' Critique Aristotle, p. 577, n. 15.

[47] In the Latin translation the description 'ambiguous' (or as it is called th 'analogous') terms refers only to what I designate here by B. This is due to the f that the Latin translation contains only one kind of equivocal terms instead of the t kinds found in the Hebrew translation, and consequently the Latin translation tal Averroes' concluding statement "Et istae species, exceptis primis duabus specieb sunt notae in nominibus analogis [= ambiguis]," יודעו לבר המינים הראשונים, ו המינים, בשמות המסופקים, to refer to B and the clause *exceptis primis duabus speciebus* to re to the one kind of equivocal terms and to A.

A. (1) [Primitive] terms, such, e.g., as the term 'being' in application to 'substance,' 'quantity,' 'quality' and the her categories, or the term 'heat' in its application to 'fire' d to other hot objects.[48]

(2) Derivative terms, such, e.g., as the term 'medical' in its plication to a 'lancet' and to a 'drug,' the term 'healthy' to ymnastics' and 'symptom,' the term 'good' to a 'place' and house' and the term 'true' to 'slavery' and 'wisdom.'[49]

B. (1) Terms applied to things according to the order of iority and posteriority, such, e.g., as the term 'essence' in application to many of the categories and their species.[50]

כנמצא אשר יאמר על העצם, על הכמות והאיכות, ושאר המאמרות, והחום אשר יאמר על האש ועל שאר הדברים החמים.

[48] Sicut est nomen entis, quod dicitur substantia, quantitate, et qualitate, et teris praedicamentis, et sicut caliditas e dicitur de igne et caeteris rebus cali-

In his Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, VII (ed. M. Bouyges, 1930, § 37, pp. 387–388) he adds hese two examples taken from 'being' and 'heat' also the example of 'motion' in its lication to locomotion and to other kinds of motion.

ומהם מה שיאמר בשם הנגזר משמותיו, כאמרך אומל רפואי וסם רפואי והתעמלות בריאות וסימן בריאותי.

[49] Et earum sunt quae dicuntur nomine ivato a nominibus, ut si dixeris phlebo- ium medicinalem [et pharmacum medi- ale, exercitationem salubrem et signum ibre], (locum bonum et domum bonam, am servitutem et veram sapientiam).

In this Latin quotation, the passage within brackets is supplied from the Hebrew sion; that within parentheses is omitted in the Hebrew. The example of the term dical' occurs also in Averroes' Epitome of the Metaphysics (cf. Averroes: Com- dio de Metafisica, ed. Quirós, 1919, II, § 3, p. 37) where he adds also an example n the term 'military.'

מהם מה שיהיה יחסם אליהם (במדרגה והקדמה ואיחור) [במדרגת הקדימה והאיחור] כיחס הרבה מהמאמרות ומיניהם אל העצם.

[50] Quaedam comparantur ad ipsam ndum prioritatem et posterioritatem, t est comparatio multorum praedica- torum et specierum eorum ad sub- rtiam.

I take the term עצם, *substantia*, in this passage to reflect the Arabic *dhāt*, i.e., the ek *τὸ τί ἐστι*, rather than the Arabic *jauhar*, i.e., the Greek *οὐσία*, and accordingly rroes' passage here may be taken to reflect the following passage in Aristotle's taphysics VII, 4, 1030a, 17–23: "'Definition,' like the essence of a thing (*τὸ τί ἐστι*), several meanings, for the essence of a thing in one sense signifies substance (*οὐσία*) the individual thing, but in another sense signifies each of the categories, quantity, lity, and the like. For as 'being' (*τὸ ἔστιν*) belongs to all things, though not in the e sense, but to one sort of thing primarily and to others consequently, so also 'es- e' (*τὸ τί ἐστιν*) belongs to substance absolutely but to the other categories in a sort ay." That the term *substantia* in this passage of Averroes cannot be taken in its al sense is quite evident from the context.

(2) Terms applied to things according to the same order.[51]

(3) Terms applied to things according to the relation
analogy, such, e.g., as the term "principle' in its application t
the 'heart' of an animal, the 'foundation' of a wall, and th
'upper end' of a road.[52]

(4) Terms applied to things according to a relation of di
ference, such, e.g., as the term 'vinaceous' in its application t
a bunch of grapes and to the color of a face.[53] By this type
ambiguous term Averroes undoubtedly means the same as th
which Algazali in his *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*, p. 44, describes as the a
plication of a term to two things according to a difference
'intensity and slightness' and illustrates by the example
'whiteness' in its application to ivory and a crown.[54] As
what justification Averroes had in including this kind of ter
under ambiguous terms, we shall discuss it in connection wi
Maimonides.

Averroes' classification, on the whole, as will have been n
ticed, is, with the exception of the inclusion of analogy, only
different arrangement of the elements which we have alrea
met previously in Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Algazali and t
origin of which in Aristotle we have already accounted f
The inclusion of analogy, however, requires some attention.

[51] Et earum sunt, quarum comparatio ad ipsam est in gradu uno.

מהם מה שיהיה יחסם אליהם במדרגה
.ת

[52] Et earum sunt quarum comparatio fuerit ad res diversas consimiles, sicut est principium, quod dicitur de corde animalis et de fundamento domus et de extremo viae.

הם מה שיהיה מהם אל דברים מתחלפים
מתדמה, כמו ההתחלה אשר יאמר על לב
חיים ועל יסוד הקיר ועל קצה הדרך.

The Arabic term underlying מתדמה, *consimilis*, would seem to be *mutashā*
which usually translates the Greek ὅμοιος (cf. Averroes' Epitome of the Metaphy
I, ed. Quirós, p. 25, § 45, last line, and Metaphysics V, 9, 1018a, 15.) But here I t
it to reflect the Greek ἀναλογικός on the ground that the examples used here by Av
roes are similar to those used by Porphyry (Commentaria in Categorias, ed. A. Bu
1887, p. 65, ll. 31 ff.) as illustrations of analogy.

The enumeration of the various meanings of 'principium' in this passage of Aver
reflects Aristotle's discussion of the various meanings of ἀρχή in Metaphysics VI
1012b, 34–1013a, 1, and 1013a, 4–7.

[53] Vel erit eis ad rem unam comparatio diversa, ac si diceres uvam vinosam et faciem vinosam.

ו שיהיה אל דבר אחד יחס מתחלף,
ורך ענב יני ומראה יני.

[54] Cf. above, nn. 29 and 30.

rtain passages Aristotle speaks of analogical terms as if he eant by them the same as equivocal terms, as, e.g., when he aintains that things can be called 'one by analogy' even if ey are not of the same genus or category.[55] Now, not to be the same genus or category and still be described by the me term *analogically* means, by Aristotle's own definition of quivocalness, to be described by that term *equivocally*. Still one passage he admits that there is some difference, even if ly an apparent difference, between these two kinds of terms. In the case of equivocal terms," he says, "sometimes the different senses in which they are used are far removed from one nother . . ., and sometimes again they are nearly related ther generically or analogically, with the result that they em not to be equivocal though they really are." [56] Furthere, in that passage of the *Topics* where, as we have shown, ristotle differentiates what Alexander calls ambiguous terms om equivocal terms, there is an indication that analogical rms would be placed by him under ambiguous terms. Toward e end of his discussion there of what is meant by ambiguous rms, Aristotle concludes that "this rule is useful in dealing ith relative terms; for cases of this kind are generally cases relative terms." [57] What he means to say is that relative rms are ambiguous terms. Now analogy is defined by Aristle as a sort of relation,[58] and consequently analogical terms ould according to him be included under ambiguous terms.

Probably the most troublesome description of ambiguous rms is that given by Maimonides in his *Millot ha-Higgayon* d his *Moreh Nebukim*. It differs from all the descriptions we ve met with before in two respects. In the first place, in his planation of ambiguous terms he uses none of the explanaons we have thus far found among his predecessors. Instead gives the following explanation. "An ambiguous term is a rm which is applied to two or more objects (*a*) on account of mething which they have in common but (*b*) that thing hich they have in common does not constitute the essence of

[55] Metaphysics V, 6, 1017a, 2–3.
[56] Physics VII, 4, 249a, 23–25.
[57] Topics II, 3, 111a, 6–7.
[58] Metaphysics V, 6, 1016b, 34–35.

either one of them." [59] Or again: "Terms used ambiguously are those which are applied to two things (*a*) between which there is a similarity in respect to a certain thing and (*b*) that thing in which they are similar is an accident in both of them and does not constitute the essence of either of them." [60] In the second place, the example by which he illustrates the use of ambiguous terms is none of the examples we have thus far met with among his predecessors in illustration of ambiguous terms but rather one based on that which is used by Aristotle in *Categories*, Ch. 1, 1a, 1–6, as an illustration of an equivocal term. As given by Maimonides, the illustration reads as follows: "An example thereof is the term 'man' in its application to a certain Reuben who is by definition endowed with life and rationality and to the corpse of a certain dead person or to the figure of a man made of wood or stone or to the painted picture of a man. The term 'man' is predicated of all of them by virtue of the common element which they possess, namely the shape and the appearance of man, but that shape and appearance do not constitute the essence of man." [61]

It is my purpose now to show, first, how like all the explanations of ambiguous terms which we have already discussed the explanation of Maimonides can also be traced to Aristotle, and second, how Maimonides came to transfer Aristotle's illustration for equivocal terms to ambiguous terms.

With regard to Maimonides' general explanation of ambiguous terms, it will be noticed that a similar explanation is implied in some of the examples given by Algazali and Averroes. When Algazali says that 'whiteness' in its application to ivory and to a crown is an ambiguous term, the implication is that ambiguous terms include also terms which indicate some accidental quality which exists in two things, for whiteness,

[59] Millot ha-Higgayon, Ch. 13. [60] Moreh Nebukim I, 56.

[61] Millot ha-Higgayon, Ch. 13. There is one notable difference between the original example by Aristotle in Categories, Ch. I, and its reproduction by Maimonides. In Aristotle, it is the term 'animal' that is taken as the subject of the example. In Maimonides, it is the term 'man.' But the substitution of 'man' for 'animal' is also to be found in John of Damascus, Dialectica, Ch. 16 (Migne, Vol. 94, Col. 580), in Avicenna's Shifā' (Cf. Madkour, L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe, p. 62) and in Algazali's *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*, p. 44.

is example, is an accidental quality in both ivory and a crown. similar inference is to be drawn also from Averroes' example f the term 'vinaceousness' in its application to grapes and a ace, for here, too, vinaceousness is an accident to both grapes nd faces. Algazali, Averroes and Maimonides, therefore, espite the differences in the language which they use, express common view, and this common view, it is reasonable to asume, must ultimately go back to a common source. What is hat common source?

The common source, I believe, is again that passage in the *Topics* in which Aristotle discusses what Alexander calls for im ambiguous terms. Of the four types of ambiguous terms numerated there by Aristotle, the first, second and fourth of hich we have already discussed, the third is described by him s a term which is applied to two different things, to one of hich it belongs *per se* (*καθ' αὐτό*) and to the other *per accidens* (*κατὰ συμβεβηκός*).[62] Of these two expressions, as will be noticed, ne second, *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, suggests at once the 'accident' hich 'does not constitute the essence' spoken of by Maimonides nd implied in the examples of 'whiteness' and 'vinaceousness' entioned by Algazali and Averroes. The first expression, owever, namely, *καθ' αὐτό*, which is generally translated by essentially,' would seem to be quite the opposite of the 'accident' which these three authors mention or allude to. But I all try to show that by *καθ' αὐτό* here Aristotle refers also to n accident.

The expression *καθ' αὐτό*, according to Aristotle, has several eanings, of which two are necessary for our present purpose. ometimes it refers to the genus of a thing and its differentiae nd in this sense the expression means that which constitutes ne essence or definition of a thing.[63] But sometimes it refers lso to accidents, but such accidents as reside 'primarily' (*πρώτῳ*), i.e., directly, in a thing, even though they do not constitute the essence of the thing. Aristotle illustrates this by the xample of 'whiteness' which, though only an accident, is said o reside in surface *καθ' ἑαυτήν*, in the sense that it resides in it

[62] Topics II, 3, 110b, 21–22.

[63] Metaphysics V, 18, 1022a, 27–29.

primarily or directly.[64] As contrasted with *καθ' αὐτό* in this latter sense, the expression *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* means an accident which resides in something in a manner opposite to 'primarily' (*πρώτως*). The opposite of *πρώτως*, as we have seen above,[65] is described by Aristotle as *ἐπομένως*, i.e., *next, secondarily, subsequently, indirectly.*

In the passage of the *Topics* under consideration it is quite evident from the two examples used by Aristotle that the contrasting expressions *καθ' αὐτό* and *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* both refer to accidents but that in one case the accident belongs to a thing primarily and in the other case subsequently. Thus, for his first example he takes the phrase 'equal to two right angles' which, according to him, is applied to the angles of a triangle *καθ' αὐτό* but to the angles of any equilateral figure *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, because in the latter case it is so only indirectly, by the mere accident that the equilateral figure happens to be a triangle.[66] Now, we happen to know from another place of his writings, that having its angles equal to two right angles is said by Aristotle to be predicated of a triangle *καθ' αὐτό* only in the sense that it is a permanent 'accident' of it, but not in the sense that it constitutes its essence (*μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα*).[67] His second example is that of the desire of the sweet-toothed person for sweetness and for wine, in the former case of which it is *καθ' αὐτό*, i.e., directly, and in the latter case, it is *κατὰ συμβεβηκός*, i.e., indirectly, because of the accident that the wine happens to be sweet. Here, too, the desire in both cases is only an accident. So interpreted, therefore, Aristotle's third kind of ambiguous terms inevitably refers to a term which indicates some common accident existing in two things, but in one of these things it exists 'primarily' and in the other it exists 'subsequently.'

This is exactly the explanation of ambiguous terms as given by Maimonides and as is also implied, as I have shown, in the examples used by Algazali and Averroes. They all speak of terms which indicate some common accident which exists in two things. Furthermore, a careful examination of the example

[64] Metaphysics V, 18, 1022a, 29–31.
[65] Cf. above, nn. 27 and 28.
[66] Topics II, 3, 110b, 22–25.
[67] Metaphysics V, 30, 1025a, 30–32.

used by them will show that according to all of them the common accident exists in one of these things primarily and in the other subsequently. This is quite clear in the case of Averroes and Maimonides, for the 'vinaceousness' in Averroes' example belongs to grapes primarily and to a face subsequently, and similarly the human shape and appearance in Maimonides' example belongs to the living man primarily and to the corpse and figure or picture of a man subsequently. In the case of Algazali it is not so obvious. But if we take the term 'crown' in his example to refer to an ivory crown, it will follow that 'whiteness' belongs to ivory primarily and to the ivory crown subsequently. Indeed Algazali describes the difference between the whiteness of the ivory and that of the crown as a difference of 'intensity' and 'slightness' which, as we have shown, corresponds to what Aristotle calls a difference of 'more or less.' But it is quite possible that the change of vocabulary was introduced here intentionally for the purpose of indicating that in the example used the difference between the whiteness of the ivory and the ivory whiteness of the crown is that of 'primarily' and 'subsequently' and not that of 'more' or 'less.'

As for the illustration of ambiguous terms given by Maimonides, it can be explained, I believe, by the combination of the following circumstances: (*a*) The infrequency of the use of Aristotle's example of a real man and the picture of a man as an illustration of equivocal terms in Arabic philosophy. (*b*) The change of meaning in an Arabic term which originally in Arabic translations of Aristotle's works was used for the Greek term meaning 'equivocal.' (*c*) The double meaning of the term under which Algazali includes the example from a real man and the picture of a man.

(*a*) It is noteworthy that most of the Arabic original treatises on logic prior to Maimonides do not use the Aristotelian example from a real man and the picture of a man as an illustration for equivocal terms. Instead they use as an illustration the Arabic term *'ain* which means 'eye' and 'spring of water.' [68] In this indeed they had the precedent of post-Aristotelian Greek

[68] Additional meanings of the term *'ain* are given in Najāt (p. 142) and in Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah (p. 11).

philosophers who had similarly substituted for Aristotle's example the example of a word which has several unrelated meanings. Thus Philo uses the example of the term 'dog' which means a terrestrial animal, a marine monster and a celestial star.[69] The Neoplatonic commentators on Aristotle, such as Porphyry, Simplicius, Dexippus, Ammonius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus and Elias, all use such illustrations as Ajax, which refers to both the son of Oileus and the son of Telamon, and Alexander, which refers to both the son of Priam and the son of Philip.[70] Similarly John of Damascus, though in one place he reproduces the Aristotelian illustration,[71] in another place uses the illustration of 'dog' which means both a terrestrial and a marine dog.[72] The texts in which the example of a real man and the picture of a man does occur are: (*a*) The Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Categories*. (*b*) Avicenna's *Shifā'*. (3) Algazali's *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*, where, however, it occurs not as an illustration of equivocal terms but as in Porphyry's commentary on the *Categories* and as in John of Damascus' *Dialectica* as an illustration of terms which he calls *mutashābih*, reflecting the term ὁμοιότης used by Porphyry[73] and John of Damascus.[74] If we assume now that the direct source of Maimonides' example of a real man and the picture of a man was either the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Categories* or Algazali's *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*, we shall be able to explain how Maimonides came to use that example as an illustration of ambiguous terms.

(*b*) In the Arabic translation of the *Categories*, in that passage where the example of a real man and the picture of a man occurs, the term used for 'equivocal' is not the term *mushtarak* which is generally used by Maimonides, but rather the term *muttafiq*.[75] We further observe that while both the term

[69] De Plantatione Noe 37, § 151.

[70] Cf. their respective commentaries on Categories, Ch. 1, 1a, 1 ff., in Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca.

[71] Dialectica, Ch. 16 (Migne, Vol. 94, Col. 580).

[72] Ibid., Ch. 30 (ibid., Col. 596).

[73] Porphyrius in Categorias, p. 65, ll. 25–30 and cf. l. 19.

[74] Dialectica, Ch. 30.

[75] Cf. M. Bouyges, op. cit., p. 6, l. 2 of Aristotle's Text.

mushtarak and the term *muttafiq* are used as translations of the Greek term for 'equivocal' in the early Arabic translation of Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* [76] as well as by such an early Arabic philosopher as Alfarabi,[77] later philosophers, such as Avicenna and Algazali, use only the term *mushtarak* in that sense. From this we have reason to infer that the term *muttafiq* in the course of time had lost its meaning of 'equivocal.' This inference may be confirmed by the fact that Averroes, in his Middle Commentary on the *Categories*, after reproducing from the old translation of the *Categories* the term "*muttafiqah*" found it necessary to add: "that is, *mushtarakah*." [78] But more than that. Not only has the term *muttafiq* lost its meaning of 'equivocal' but it has also acquired a new meaning, that of 'ambiguous,' for which the term generally used was *mushakkik*. Thus Algazali in two places in his *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah*, in the Logic (pp. 11–12) and the Metaphysics (p. 44), uses *muttafiq*[79] as well as *mushakkik* in the sense of 'ambiguous,' and in the Logic he uses the former as the main term. Thus the changed meaning of the term *muttafiqah* used in the Arabic translation of Aristotle's *Categories* may furnish the explanation for the use made by Maimonides of Aristotle's example for equivocal terms as an example for ambiguous terms.

(*c*) Or, the explanation may be furnished by the duplicity of meaning of the term *mutashābih* under which Algazali reproduces the example of a real man and the picture of a man in his *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*. This term means both 'similar' and 'ambiguous.' If we assume therefore that Maimonides has drawn upon this work for his example of a real man and the

[76] Cf. "Glossar" under these two terms in Isidor Pollak, Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Übersetzung des Isḥāq ibn Ḥonain (Leipzig, 1913).

[77] Op. cit.

[78] Cf. M. Bouyges, op. cit., p. 6, l. 4.

[79] Translated into Hebrew by נאות (Kawwanot ha-Pilosofim, Ms. Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, Cod. Heb. 901). In the Latin translation (Algazel's Metaphysics, ed. J. T. Muckle, 1933, p. 26, ll. 9–10) the term *muttafiq* is rendered "eo quod aptatur omnibus," which follows immediately the statement "et vocatur nomen ambiguum," and it is thus taken not as an alternative of the term *mushakkik* (*ambiguum*) but rather as an explanation of it. The Arabic as printed should be rendered "aut vocatur nomen aptum." Evidently the Latin translation is based upon a different reading of the Arabic text.

picture of a man, it is quite possible that he took the term *mutashābih* in both these meanings. He therefore combined it with the term *mushakkik* and placed under it the example of a real man and the picture of a man. Traces of such a combination are to be noticed in *Moreh Nebukim* I, 56, where in his description of terms used 'ambiguously' (*bi-tashkīk*) he maintains that "ambiguous terms imply a certain similarity (*tashābuh*)." The plausibility of this assumption may be further supported by the fact that the Arabic term for 'similarity' (*ishtibāh*) was taken in the sense of 'ambiguity' by a mediaeval Latin translator from the Arabic in a passage which is the ultimate underlying source of the passage in Algazali under consideration. This passage in Algazali is unmistakably based upon a passage in which Porphyry describes what he calls ὁμώνυμος καθ' ὁμοιότητα.[80] But Porphyry's passage itself is undoubtedly based upon a passage in Aristotle's *Physics* VII, 4, 249a, 23–24, which says that "in the case of equivocal terms . . . sometimes there is a certain similarity (τινα ὁμοιότητα) between them." Now in the old Latin translation of the *Physics* made from the Arabic, this passage reads as follows: "Aequivocarum . . . alia autem in eis est *ambiguitas*." [81] It is quite evident that the Greek ὁμοιότης here could not have become the Latin *ambiguitas* unless we assume that the intermediate Arabic term was *ishtibāh* which means both 'similarity' and 'ambiguity' and that the Latin translator took it in the sense of ambiguity. Similarly in the Latin translation of Averroes' Long Commentary on this passage the term *ambiguitas*[82] undoubtedly reflects the Arabic *ishtibāh*.

If we assume therefore that Maimonides has learned of the

[80] Porphyrius in Categorias, p. 65, l. 19, cf. Baneth, op. cit., p. 37.

[81] Aristotelis Opera (Venice, 1574), Vol. IV, p. 331 E.

[82] Ibid., p. 331 I–K. Incidentally, it may be noted that as in the case of the term *mutashābih* so also in the case of the term *mushkil*, from its original meaning of 'similar' it came to mean 'ambiguous' (cf. Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon, s.v.) in which sense it is used by Alfarabi in his description of ambiguous terms (loc. cit.), though in this case of Alfarabi it may be a corruption of *mushakkik*, as has been suggested by Baneth (op. cit., p. 38, n. 18). An indirect suggestion as to some sort of association between the terms 'similar' and 'ambiguous' may be discerned in the statement "habet quamdam similitudinem atque ambiguitatem" in Boetii in Librum De Interpretatione Editio Secunda (Migne, Vol. 64, Col. 466 B; ed. Meiser, p. 143, ll. 15–16).

example of a real man and the picture of a man either from the Arabic translation of the *Categories* or from Algazali's *Mi'yār al-'Ilm*, we can easily see how he came to use that example as an illustration for ambiguous terms.

We have seen thus that the Arabic term *mushakkik* both historically, as a translation of the Greek ἀμφίβολος, and etymologically, as a derivative of the Arabic root *shakk*, to doubt, is to be translated in any language by a term which means 'doubtful' or 'ambiguous.' Now, in Hebrew it is always correctly translated by *mesuppaq*. In Latin translations from the Arabic, however, there is no uniformity in the term used for *mushakkik*. In the old mediaeval translations it is on the whole correctly rendered by *ambiguus*.[83] But in the 15th century Latin translations from the Hebrew it is often translated by *analogicus*.[84] Similarly in modern translations from the Arabic the term *mushakkik* is also often translated by 'analogical.'[85]

The reason for this, it seems to me, is to be found in St. Thomas Aquinas and the other scholastic writers who follow his vocabulary. In Thomas Aquinas the term *analogia*, with its derivative forms, has many meanings, based upon various sources, and among them are included some of those mean-

[83] Cf. Algazel's Metaphysics, ed. J. T. Muckle (1933), p. 26, l. 9, corresponding to p. 106, l. 15 of *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifah*, and the old mediaeval Latin translation of Maimonides' Moreh Nebukim (Dux seu Director Dubitantium aut Perplexorum, Paris, 1520), I, 55 of Harizi's version (corresponding to I, 56 of Ibn Tibbon's version).

[84] Cf. Latin translation of Averroes' Epitome of the Organon, made from the Hebrew by Abraham de Balmes, quoted above in n. 43; Latin translation of Averroes' Epitome of the Metaphysics, made from the Hebrew by Mantinus, in Aristotelis Opera (Venice, 1574), Vol. VIII, p. 359 K and p. 364 A; Latin translation of Maimonides' Millot ha-Higgayon, made from the Hebrew by Munster (Logica Sapientis Rabbi Simeonis, Basel, 1527), Ch. 13; Hebrew and Latin texts quoted in I. Husik, Judah Messer Leon's Commentary on the "Vetus Logica" (1906), p. 84.

[85] Cf. M. Horten, Die Metaphysik des Averroes (1912), p. 40, l. 1; C. Quirós, Averroes Compendio de Metafisica (1919), Spanish translation, p. 58, § 3; S. van den Bergh, Die Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroes (1924), p. 28, l. 28. Dieterici in Alfarabi's Philosophische Abhandlungen, p. 146, correctly translates it by "die doppelsinnigen" but his translation of *al-muttafiqah* by 'analoge' (p. 145) is not quite correct in this instance (cf. above, n. 77, and Baneth, op. cit., p. 34, n. 6). I. Madkour in his L'Organon d'Aristote dans le monde arabe (1934) translates *mushakkik* by "équivoque" (p. 61), which in its strictly technical sense is only a synonym of "homonyme" by which he translates *mushtarak* (p. 62).

ings which in Arabic texts, through the influence of the Greek commentators on Aristotle, we have found to be attached to terms which they describe as ambiguous, so that while in Arabic philosophy 'analogical' terms are included under 'ambiguous' terms, in St. Thomas, quite conversely, 'ambiguous' terms, which he does not specify directly, are included under 'analogical' terms. Thus like the 'ambiguous' terms in Arabic philosophy, the 'analogical' terms in St. Thomas are said (*a*) to be neither 'equivocal' nor 'univocal,' [86] (*b*) to be applied to different things according to the order of priority and posteriority,[87] and (*c*) are illustrated by the example of the term 'being' in its application to 'substance' and 'accident.' [88] One can therefore readily see how translators from the Arabic or the Hebrew who were acquainted with this use of the term 'analogical' in Latin philosophic literature would come to use it as a translation of the corresponding Arabic term *mushakkik* or Hebrew term *mesuppaq*.

To sum up the results of our discussion. We have shown that an intermediate type of term, one that is neither 'equivocal' nor 'univocal,' is mentioned by Aristotle himself in such places as *Topics* II, 3, 110b, 16–17, and *Metaphysics* IV, 2, 1003a. 33–34 and VII, 4, 1030a, 34–35. The name 'ambiguous' was given to it by Alexander in his commentary on the *Topics*. In Aristotle's discussion in *Topics* II, 3, 110b, 16–111a, 7, of what Alexander calls for him ambiguous terms, four types of such terms are enumerated: 1. Terms applied to things having one end or else, according to passages in *Metaphysics* XI, 3, 1061a. 3–5 and *Nicomachean Ethics* I, 6, 1096b, 27–28, proceeding from one source. 2. Terms applied to things which are contraries. 3. Terms applied to certain common accidents which exist in things according to a difference of primariness and subsequency. 4. Relative and hence also analogical terms. 5. A fifth type of ambiguous terms is referred to in *De Anima* I, 1, 402b, 6–8, as interpreted by Alexander, and in many pas-

[86] Contra Gentiles I, 34: "neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice."

[87] I. Sententiarum, Distinct. 35, Quaest. 1, Art 4, Solutio: "Sed duplex est analogia. Quaedam secundum conventiam in aliquo uno, quod eis per prius et posterius convenit."

[88] Contra Gentiles I, 34: "sicut *ens* de substantia et accidente dicitur."

ges in the *Metaphysics*, such as VII, 4, 1030a, 21–22, VII, 1, 028a, 13–15 and 30–31, namely, that which is used according priority and posteriority or according to first and next. We ave also shown how the various descriptions of ambiguous rms which occur in the writings of Alfarabi, Avicenna, Algali, Averroes and Maimonides reproduce either one or more an one of those five types of ambiguous terms enumerated y Aristotle. Alfarabi and Avicenna mention 2 (contraries) and (prior and posterior). Algazali mentions 1 (one end and one ource), 3 (accident) and 5 (prior and posterior). Averroes entions 1 (one end and one source or both), 3 (accident), (analogy) and 5 (prior and posterior). Maimonides mentions (accident). We have further shown how the examples used y them in illustration of the various types of ambiguous rms are also derived from Aristotle. Finally, we have shown ow under the influence of the terminology of St. Thomas quinas, whose term 'analogy' has absorbed what in Arabic hilosophy is called 'ambiguous,' the Arabic as well as the Hebrew term for 'ambiguous' is often translated into Latin and nodern languages by the term 'analogical.'

TWO PROBLEMS IN MELITO'S HOMILY ON THE PASSION

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Even at the cost of a slight delay to the publication of the Homily on the Passion, it has seemed prudent to submit to the readers of this Review two problems arising out of Melito's language, which are not without their difficulties. If the view here taken about the first of these is open to other objections than those which the writer has anticipated, he will be grateful to any reader who will call them to his attention. As to the second, it is likely that Hebrew and patristic scholars may be able to add further illustrations. Such contributions will be most welcome.[1]

Reading, Explanation, and Sermon

The opening sentence of Melito's Homily on the Passion reads as follows: *ἡ μὲν γραφὴ τῆς Ἑβραϊκῆς ἐξόδου ἀνέγνωσται καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ μυστηρίου διασεσάφηται, πῶς τὸ πρόβατον θύεται καὶ πῶς ὁ λαὸς σώζεται.* The meaning of the second clause, *τὰ ῥήματα τοῦ μυστηρίου διασεσάφηται*, has been understood in two different ways by different scholars who have seen the text. The reasons for the difference of opinion are to be found partly in the range of meanings which the verb *διασαφέω* may have, partly in the vagueness of our information about the exact procedure that the early church followed in the matter of scripture reading and sermon. The early date of Melito's homily (not later than 190) makes it particularly desirable that the implications of the passage should be cleared up and its liturgical significance understood.

The first and, as it seems to me, the more natural of the two

[1] Mr. A. D. Nock has already earned my thanks by bringing to my notice some of the way material. — The edition of the Homily will appear in Studies and Documents. A preliminary article was published in Mélanges Cumont 107–119 (Annuaire de l'institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves, IV, 1936), and a summary of further studies of the homily is to be printed in the forthcoming Proceedings of the Congress of Papyrology held at Oxford, 1937.

interpretations is "The words of the mystery have been explained;" the two πῶς clauses that follow mention the subjects comprised in the reading that have received particular treatment in the explanation. If this interpretation of Melito's words is right, they imply that an "explanation" might exist in the liturgy as a thing separate both from the reading and the homily proper.[2]

It is probable that a doubt whether such a liturgical arrangement can be accepted has led to the other view of Melito's words. According to it, we should translate "The words of the mystery have been set forth plainly," understanding that the reading of the scriptural passage has itself brought the words describing the Passover rite clearly to the ears and minds of the congregation. If we view the passage thus, no exegesis apart from the sermon itself need be considered. Now it is true that διασαφεῖν can mean *set forth plainly, declare* (Plato Laws 916e; LXX Deut. 1, 5) as well as *explain, interpret* (Matt. 13, 36);[3] but with anything meaning *problem, parable, statement*, or, as in Melito, *words*, the latter translation seems to be more suitable.[4]

If τὰ ῥήματα . . . διασεσάφηται means that an explanation of the text has preceded Melito's discourse, how does such a procedure agree with what is known of the practice of the church? It is not necessary to quote at length the well-known passage

[2] μυστήριον is probably used here not merely because the Passover rite was a cultic act belonging to a limited group, but also because the language that describes its institution bore an inner meaning with reference to the sacrifice of Christ.

[3] I have found the following instances of διασαφεῖν governing objects meaning saying or the Law or the Scriptures, with the aid of Thackeray-Marcus, Lexicon to Josephus, and Stählin's Index to Clement of Alexandria: Jos. Ant. 5, 293; 12, 38 and 108; Clem. Paed. Vol. I, p. 97, 5 Stählin; 178, 18; Strom. Vol. II, p. 490, 10–11; 495, 29; 496, 22–23; 466, 2–3.

[4] Two other views of this passage which might conceivably occur to a reader may be mentioned, but only to remove them from further consideration. (1) If we had in the text of Melito τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦ μυστηρίου, we might suppose that the phrase was equivalent to "the matter of the mystery," by a Hebraism which occurs both in the Old and in the New Testament; but in this locution, as far as I have observed, the singular ῥῆμα is always used, the plural never. (2) διασεσάφηται cannot be treated as middle with ῥήματα as subject and the πῶς clauses as dependent questions. L. and S. cite as a dubious use of the middle a Paris papyrus fragment (it is really no. 1564 B, Notices et Extraits 18, 2, p. 413), but the context is uncertain, owing to mutilation, and it should not be used as evidence.

hat tell us the little that is recorded. Justin says that after he reader has finished, the presiding officer or leader of the ongregation (ὁ προεστώς) admonishes the flock and exhorts hem to follow the good examples of the Scripture.[5] Origen's words καὶ δι' ἀναγνωσμάτων καὶ διὰ τῶν εἰς αὐτὰ διηγήσεων προτρέοντες indicate a blending of explanation and exhortation.[6] A entence in Const. Apost. (2, 54) mentions the διδασκαλία that ollows the reading. Evidently that which was said after the eading might include explanation, admonition, or exhortaion. But thus far there is no indication of a methodical divi- ion of the proceedings into reading, explanation, and homily n a broader sense.

The practice of the synagogues, from which the custom of the arly church derives, scarcely helps to explain our problem. The iscourse that followed the reading of the Law might be ex- ository or edifying;[7] but there is no indication that those two lements of it were separated in such a way as to set up a three- old division of the procedure into reading, explanation, and ermon. Nor does it appear that any light is to be gained from ne Jewish distinction between *halacha*, precise formulation of ne traditional law, and *haggada*, interesting or edifying dis- ourse based upon the reading, because the former of these onstituent parts was not continued when the Law was no nger the guide of life.

It is known that after Hebrew ceased to be the language of aily life, the reading of the Law was followed by a free trans- tion or paraphrase in Aramaic; but in the Hellenistic syna- ogues, where the Scriptures were read in a Greek version, here was no need of a translation. It is remotely possible that ne habit of listening to a translation or paraphrase prepared ne way for some explanation of obscure expressions, historical vents, customs and institutions, even after the need for a anslation had passed.

In seeking Melito's exact meaning, we shall probably do best examine what is known of the function of the reader in the

[5] 1 Apol. 67. [6] Contra Cels. 3, 50.

[7] For the present purpose it suffices to refer to the treatment of synagogue practice G. F. Moore's Judaism, I, 286–305.

early church, a subject which has been illuminated by the researches of Harnack.[8] He shows by the evidence of the prayer at the consecration of the reader (Apost. Const. 8, 22), δὸς αὐτῷ πνεῦμα ἅγιον, πνεῦμα προφητικόν, that his function cannot have been merely the mechanical one of reading the Scriptures, and that the quality of διηγητικός, which was expected of him (Apost. Church Order 19), implied ability to expound what he had read.[9] Further, he was sometimes regarded as performing the function and receiving the honor due to a prophet or an evangelist. Harnack also argues that the so-called second letter of Clement is a homily actually delivered by a reader (ch. 19, 1).

Harnack's study of the subject makes it clear that, at least in some early Christian communities, the reader's position was highly regarded, and that some duties that later belonged to the bishop were assigned to or at least shared with the reader; further, that ability to explain the Scriptures was one of his essential qualifications. But thus far one could only say that the boundary between the functions of the reader and those of the other clergy was not strictly drawn in the early period, that the reader sometimes explained as well as read the Scriptures and that his explanation might develop into a hortatory discourse. The threefold pattern of reading, explanation, and sermon is still not clearly made out. Nevertheless, definite evidence for it is to be found in a passage which seems to have escaped Harnack's attention.[10] The opening sentence of Origen's Homily XV on Numbers reads as follows:[11]

Licet nos ordo lectionum, quae recitantur, de illis dicere magis exigat quae lector explicuit, tamen quoniam nonnulli fratrum deposcunt ea potius

[8] A. Harnack, Die Quellen der sogenannten apostolischen Kirchenordnung: nebst einer Untersuchung über den Ursprung des Lectorats (Texte und Untersuchungen II, 5). The parts of this monograph which are used, without further references, in the text above, are pp. 16–17; 43; 62–63; 73–75; 82–84. Wieland's work in Römisch. Quartalschrift, Suppl. 7, 1892, is unfortunately not accessible to me.

[9] For this use of διηγήσασθαι cf. Origen, Hom. XIX on Jeremiah, Berlin ed., Vol. III, p. 166, 35: ἐνθάδε ὁ ἀγών ἐστι παραστῆσαι τὸ βούλημα τῶν γραμμάτων, καὶ δ ὁμολογῶ κατ' ἐμαυτὸν μὴ δύνασθαι αὐτὰ διηγήσασθαι.

[10] It did not, however, escape the fine net cast by Cabrol and Leclercq, Monumenta Ecclesiae Liturgica, I, p. 120 (No. 1240).

[11] Berlin ed., Vol. VII, p. 128, 17–21. That *explicuit* means "has explained" an

uae de prophetia Balaam scripta sunt, ad sermonem disputationis adduci, on ita ordini lectionum satisfacere aequum credidi, ut desideriis auditorum.

The reader had read a considerable pericope and had explained some part of it, but not the part which Origen had been asked to discuss; hence the apology. If such a procedure was still followed, even if only occasionally, in Origen's time, there seems to be no objection to the assumption that Melito's reader, after going through the proper selection from Exodus 2, followed his reading with some sentences of explanation before Melito ascended the pulpit and began his homily. Two other possibilities, which seem to me much less likely, are (1) that Melito himself gave the explanation, but did not commit it to writing and make it a part of his homily; or (2) that Melito incorporated it into his sermon, and a later editor omitted it as of less interest than the sermon itself. In the latter case the editor must have recast the opening sentence (which, however, shows no sign of re-handling). The excision of the explanatory sentences or paragraphs might have commended itself to an editor who was planning a book of selections, such as our manuscript appears to have been.

Even when the homilist himself took over the explanatory comment upon the Scripture lection, it occasionally occupies a place of its own, so clearly marked as to remind one forcibly that it was sometimes independent of the structure of the homily. As might be expected, there are examples of this in Origen, whose predilection for allegorical interpretation inclined him to confine comment upon the letter of the reading within definite and rather narrow limits. It would probably not be hard to add other examples to the three which follow.

Hom. XIV in Levit., ad init. (Berlin ed. Vol. VI, p. 478) Historia nobis recitata est, cuius quamvis videatur aperta narratio, tamen nisi diligentius intinentiam eius quae est secundum literam consequamur, interior nobis nsus haud facile patebit. (This is the prelude to a paragraph in which the milist treats the text according to its natural meaning before offering an legorical interpretation.)

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simply "has made known," "has brought before you," is shown by Hom. VI on lges 4 (Berlin ed., Vol. VII, p. 502), continuationem cantici per singula non occurris explicare.

The next passage occurs, not at the beginning of the whole sermon, but before the speaker takes up a new division of his text.

Hom. XIX in Jerem. (20, 1–7), Berlin ed. Vol. III, p. 166, 31–35: *ἔδει ἐπιτέμνεσθαι τὴν περικοπὴν ὅλην καὶ σαφηνίσαι, οὐδέπω τὸ νόημα αὐτῆς τὸ βαθὺ (εἴγε χωροῦμεν αὐτό), ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν λέξιν καὶ τὸ ῥητὸν αὐτό, ὃ καὶ ὁ τυχὼν ἐπιστήσας ἐπιμελῶς τοῖς γράμμασι καὶ μὴ ἐκ παρέργου δύναται κἂν οὕτως νοῆσαι.*

The arrangement of the material, and the words used in relation to it, are of special interest in the fourth Homily on Jeremiah (3, 6–11); Berlin ed. Vol. III, p. 22: *αὐτὸ τὸ ῥητὸν τῆς ἀναγνωσθείσης λέξεως ἔχει τι ἀσαφές, ὅπερ πρότερον νοηθήτω καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐὰν ὁ θεὸς διδῷ, εἰσόμεθα τὸ βούλημα αὐτοῦ τὸ μυστικόν ⟨οὐκ⟩οὖν θέλει ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἐν τούτοις ὅτι, ὡς ἐν ταῖς Βασιλείαις γέγραπται, διῃρέθη ὁ λαὸς ἐν τοῖς χρόνοις Ῥοβοάμ, κτλ.* The speaker goes on to say that the division between Israel and Judah was permanent. Because of the sins of Israel, its tribes were taken into captivity and so remain "to this day." Judah also sinned and was punished by a captivity of seventy years. The sin of Judah was really the greater, because its people had not profited by the example of the punishment of Israel; but Jeremiah is commanded to prophesy and foretell the eventual reunion of Israel and Judah. Origen then says, *ᾧ δὴ μέλει τῶν ἀναγνωσμάτων λαβέτω τὰ ῥήματα τῆς ὅλης σήμερον ἀναγνώσεως καὶ τότε ὄψεται τὰ νοήματα δεδηλῶσθαι.*

Here the preacher himself has given the *διασάφησις* of the reading, which, as we have reason to believe, the reader gave before Melito's sermon.[12] It might have been expected that Origen would turn to the allegorical interpretation or moral application of the reading immediately after the last words quoted above. But instead of doing so, he gives up the greater part of a page to a repetition of his text (Jerem. 3, 3–11) with some sentences of paraphrase, slightly fuller here than in the opening paragraph. The purpose must have been to impress

[12] It is a reasonable conjecture, though incapable of proof, that an explanation of the lection by the reader preceded some of the homilies in which Origen enters directly upon his "deeper" interpretation with no allusion, or only a brief one, to the overt meaning of the text.

he text upon the hearers. Then he begins the next paragraph ith the words *εἰ νενόηται τὸ ῥητόν, ἴδωμεν τί βούλεται ἐν αὐτοῖς ηλοῦσθαι. ἡ κλῆσις τῶν ἐθνῶν ἄρχην ἔσχεν ἐκ τοῦ παραπτώματος οῦ Ἰσραήλ, κτλ.* Thence he proceeds to discuss the rejection nd desolation of Israel, to point to an analogy between Judah nd Christianity, and to warn the Church against such sins as ad brought upon Judah the condemnation of God.

It is a curious fact, perhaps significant for the history of omiletic method, that something like the arrangement noted nder the last example (Origen, Hom. IV in Jerem.) was dopted by John Chrysostom for almost all of his homilies on he Acts of the Apostles. This peculiarity of Chrysostom's ıethod was brought to my attention by an *obiter dictum* in the tudy of the text of these homilies recently published by Dr. . R. Smothers, S.J.[13]

Unlike Origen, Chrysostom does not employ allegorical in- erpretation except in so far as he recognizes certain Old Testa- ıent types which have their fulfilment in the New Testament. he greater part of each one of the sermons on Acts is taken p with exegetical matter, which consists of literal explanations f the text interspersed with brief moral applications of it to he conduct of the Christian life. But this exegesis, in all but few of the homilies, falls into two parts which differ only lightly from one another in their plan and contents. The econd part, which, in fact, may be called a second exegesis, s usually introduced by a phrase which recurs with very slight ariations in homily after homily: *ἀλλ' ἴδωμεν* (or *ἴδωμεν τοίνυν, τλ.*) *ἄνωθεν τὰ εἰρημένα.* The difference between the parts con- ists principally in the circumstance that in the first exegesis he Scripture text is regularly repeated with its sentences in the roper sequence, even though separated by the comment;

[13] "Le Texte des homélies de Saint Jean Chrysostome sur les Actes des Apôtres" Recherches de Science Religieuse, XXVII [1937], 513–548, esp. p. 514); summary of thesis presented for the doctorate at the University of Michigan. — Father Smothers as generously placed at my service a précis of the organization of all of Chrysostom's omilies on the Acts, accompanied by some valuable comments, upon which the re- arks above are based. The "second exegesis" does not occur in Nos. 1, 2, 47 and (at ast not in typical form) 44; and it is very short in No. 8. It occurs occasionally in ther homilies than those based upon Acts.

while in the second, the repetition is usually not complete, the order of the matter is not scrupulously observed, and other texts may be brought in and discussed briefly to illustrate the main theme. The purpose of this second exegesis seems to have been merely to impress the text upon the minds of the hearers; an object which was particularly desirable for a work less familiar to them than the Gospels.[14]

After the exegesis is completed, Chrysostom passes on to the ἠθικόν, which, in the Homilies on Acts, is clearly differentiated from the foregoing matter, and is often marked in the manuscripts as a separate division of the sermon, the word ἠθικόν being written in the margin opposite its beginning. Though the connection between it and the text is usually perceptible, the homilist rarely emphasizes it (as in Homily 41) by repeating any part of the text or exegesis within the limits of the ethikon. Father Smothers remarks,[15] "The ethikon is a religious and moral exhortation, much less frequently a dogmatic or polemical discussion. It has a unity and amplitude of development that set it quite apart rhetorically from the exegesis."

Thus it appears that the arrangement of these homilies of Chrysostom bears a certain resemblance to Origen's fourth homily on Jeremiah, but that there is a wide difference in the extent of the parts and in the character of the division following the double exegesis. Origen's inner or allegorical interpretation of his theme occupies by far the greater part of his sermon, while Chrysostom's ethikon is more limited in compass and more strictly confined to the moral lesson suggested by the text.

The Angel and the Rending of the Temple Veil

Towards the end of his homily (p. 16, 26–32), in the course of a bitter denunciation of the Jews as the slayers of the Christ, Melito mentions the portents that attended the crucifixion, beginning with the unnatural darkness; then he continues:

καὶ γὰρ τοῦ λαοῦ μὴ τρέμοντος, ἐτρόμαξεν ἡ γῆ, τοῦ λαοῦ μὴ φοβηθέντος, ἐφοβήθησαν οἱ οὐρανοί, τοῦ λαοῦ μὴ περιεσχι⟨σ⟩μένου, περιεσχίσατο ὁ ἄγγελος,

[14] Cf. Montfaucon's preface to Vol. IX, p. vii (second Paris edition), and the beginning of Homily 1.

[15] In a letter on this subject.

οὖ λαοῦ μὴ κωλύσαντος, ἐβρόντησεν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κύριος, καὶ ὁ ὕψιστος ἔδωκεν φωνήν.

The emotional tone of this passage, which is strongly marked by its rhetorical expression, doubtless accounts for some of its departures from the tenor of Matt. 27, 51. The clause *ἐφοβήθησαν οἱ οὐρανοί* may be an imaginative interpretation of the darkness in daytime; *ἐβρόντησεν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κύριος καὶ ὁ ὕψιστος ἔδωκεν φωνήν* looks like a detail taken from some tradition other than the Gospel; but it may also be developed from Matthew's words *ἡ γῆ ἐσείσθη καὶ αἱ πέτραι ἐσχίσθησαν*. It is true that the sounds associated with seismic phenomena are often reported as low subterranean rumblings; but an earthquake which came within the writer's experience was accompanied by a sound like a suddenly arising wind.

The words *περιεσχίσατο ὁ ἄγγελος* are of special interest. They are not merely a pathetic commonplace, like our saying, "angels weep." The use of the singular number and the article indicates a definite angel; and in view of Matthew's language *τὸ καταπέτασμα τοῦ ναοῦ ἐσχίσθη ἀπ' ἄνωθεν ἕως κάτω εἰς δύο*, there can be no doubt that Melito thought of the veil of the temple as the garment of the angel who dwelt there, rent in grief and horror at the death of the Lord.

In the literature of the church there are several passages, not all of which have been previously noticed, that connect an angel with the rending of the veil. Some of these occur in authors who have probably or certainly imitated Melito; these should be examined first.

Alexander of Alexandria, Sermo de anima et corpore deque passione Domini, 6: Caeli luminaria expaverunt, sol fugit, luna disparuit, sidera lumen suum subtraxerunt, dies cessavit; templo excessit attonitus post velum dississum angelus, tenebrae tellurem obruerunt in qua Dominus eius oculos clauserat.[16]

Krüger has showed that Alexander's sermon is dependent for some of its ideas and also in some details of its language upon Melito.[17] The soundness of his conclusion, which was of course based upon an examination of the Syriac fragments (especially

[16] Mai, Nova Patrum Bibliotheca, II, 537; Migne, P. G. 18, 599 C.

[17] Zeitschrift für wiss. Theologie, XXXI (1888), 434–448.

No. 16 Otto) is now placed beyond doubt by the discovery that fr. 16 is merely a series of excerpts from our homily.[18] But Alexander treats Melito's words freely, and the language that he uses about the angel and the veil differs from that of Melito so widely as to suggest that for this detail, at least, he needed no literary precedent, but merely echoed a popular Christian tradition. Alexander's angel, in alarm at the catastrophe, rends the veil and departs from the temple. Melito implies that the rending of the veil by the angel is a gesture of mourning; but says nothing of the angel's forsaking the temple.

Pseudo-Cyprianus, Adversus Iudaeos, 4 (Hartel, p. 136): Commota est omnis nativitas in Domini passione, populus mansit immobilis sine trepidatione; angelus in paenitentiam conscisso velamine refugit, plebs sine pavore integra veste permansit; conversa sunt elementa et confusa, Israel securus duravit.

The author's dependence upon Melito, closer elsewhere than in this passage, has been proved by H. Jordan, who believed that the actual writer of the treatise was Novatian.[19] The angel's gesture is an act of penitence and contrition, emotions closely akin to that implied by Melito's *περιεσχίσατο*; but, here differing from Melito and agreeing with Alexander, the author mentions the flight of the angel expressly.

The evidence that Proclus of Constantinople (fifth century) made use of Melito's homily cannot be presented in full at this time; it will be treated in the edition of the homily which is now in preparation. The following passages are to be considered in connection with the topic before us.

Oration 11 (a discourse on the Passion delivered on Good Friday) 3 (P. G. 65, 785 B): *οὐρανὸς ἐμελανημόνει τὸ σκότος· ὁ ἥλιος ὥσπερ δοῦλος φιλοδέσποτος ἔφυγε, τὰς ἀκτῖνας συστείλας· τὰ ἄστρα τὴν φυσικὴν συνετάραττε τάξιν· ὁ ναὸς περιεσχίζετο διὰ τὸ πένθος· ἡ γῆ θρηνοῦσα οὐ βραχίονας ἔτυπτεν ἀλλὰ πέτρας ἔσχιζεν.*

Or. 12 (on the Resurrection) 2, 788 D: *ὁ οὐρανὸς ἐνεδύσατο σκότος· ὁ ἥλιος ἐδραπέτευσε τὸ μυστήριον· ἡ γῆ ἐτρόμαξε τὴν τόλμαν· ὁ ναὸς ἐθρήνησε τοὺς Χριστοκτόνους· ὁ ᾅδης πρεσβευτὰς τοὺς νεκροὺς προέπεμψεν.*

Or. 13 (Easter), 793 C–D: *εἰπὲ ἡμῖν, ὦ ναέ, διὰ τί ἔσχισας τὸ καταπέτασμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ σταυρουμένου; . . . βοᾷ καὶ ὁ ναός· ὁ πάλαι ἐν ἐμοὶ θρησκευόμενος θεός, οὗτος νῦν ὁ σαρκὶ ὑβριζόμενος· διόπερ μὴ φέρων τὴν τόλμαν διέρρηξα τὴν ἐσθῆτα.*

[18] Mélanges Cumont, p. 109.

[19] "Melito und Novatian," Arch. f. latein. Lexikographie, XIII, 61–63.

Here we find the same highly emotional interpretation of the portents that we saw in Melito, expressed in the extreme of tasteless rhetoric. But there is one important difference; the angel is not mentioned, and the rending of the veil is an act of anguish and consternation attributed to the temple itself, which, like the earth and the sun, is represented as sentient, and responsive to the tragedy of the Cross. The reason for the change is, probably, that Proclus, finding no warrant in canonical Scripture for the mention of the angel, chose to adhere more closely to the narrative of the Gospel.

Since even Alexander and Pseudo-Cyprian, who undoubtedly borrowed from Melito here and there, added to his words the idea that the angel departed from the temple, it is reasonable to suppose that they drew from an additional source, which must have been an early and popular traditional interpretation of the portent of the rent veil. That this notion was widely held is shown by some of the following passages, none of which, so far as we know, owes anything to Melito's sermon.

Tertullian, adv. Marcionem IV, 42 (ed. Kroymann, p. 564): Scissum est templi velum, angeli eruptione derelinquentis filiam Sionis tamquam in vinea speculam et in cucumerario casulam.

Clem. Recogn. 1, 41 (P. G. 1, 1231 B): Denique cum pateretur, omnis ei compassus est mundus; nam et sol obscuratus est, montesque disrupti, et sepulcra patefacta sunt, velum templi scissum est, velut lamentans excidium sibi imminens.

The next two passages, from the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, are Christian interpolations.

Test. Levi., 10, 3: *καὶ ἀνομήσετε ἐν τῷ Ἰσραήλ, ὥστε μὴ βαστάζειν τὴν Ἱερουσαλὴμ ἀπὸ προσώπου τῆς πονηρίας ὑμῶν, ἀλλὰ σχισθήσεται τὸ καταπέτασμα τοῦ ναοῦ, ὥστε μὴ καλύψαι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην ὑμῶν.*

There is an interesting variant for *καταπέτασμα*, namely *ἔνδυμα*, which has some manuscript support and is found in the Armenian and Slavic versions. In his note on the passage Charles remarks that *ἔνδυμα* is not used as a translation for the Hebrew words for veil, curtain (*parocheth*, *masaq*); I would therefore suggest that the branches of the text which use *ἔνδυμα* were influenced by the notion that the veil was the "garment" of the temple or its indwelling angel.

Test. Benj. 9, 3-5: *καὶ εἰσελεύσεται εἰς τὸν πρῶτον ναόν, καὶ ἐκεῖ Κύριος ὑβρισθήσεται, καὶ ἐπὶ ξύλου ὑψωθήσεται. καὶ ἔσται τὸ ἄπλωμα τοῦ ναοῦ σχιζόμενον, καὶ μεταβήσεται τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ ἔθνη ὥσπερ πῦρ ἐκχυνόμενον.*

Hilarius, Comm. in Matt. (P. L. 9, 1075 B): Et deinceps velum templi scinditur, quia exinde populus est divisus in partes, et veli honor cum custodia angeli protegentis aufertur. *Movetur terra*: capax enim huius mortui esse non poterat. *Petrae scissae sunt*: omnia enim tum valida et fortia penetrans Dei verbum et potestas aeternae virtutis irruperat.[20]

Jerome, Comm. in Matt. (P. L. 26, 213 A): Velum templi scissum est, et omnia legis sacramenta quae prius tegebantur prodita sunt, atque ad gentium populum transierunt. In evangelio cuius saepe facimus mentionem, superliminare templi infinitae magnitudinis fractum esse atque divisum legimus. (The Gospel mentioned in the second sentence is that of the Hebrews. In his letter to Hedybia [ep. 120], 8, Jerome again says that it recorded the breaking and fall of the great lintel, and adds that it did not tell of the rending of the temple veil.)

The next passage, which requires special consideration because of a textual problem, is not concerned with the crucifixion, yet is not entirely irrelevant. It is from the Protevangelium Jacobi. In chapter 23 Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist is slain by emissaries of Herod in the forecourt of the temple. The other priests are alarmed when he does not come out and when one of them goes in to see what has happened, he finds a pool of blood on the floor beside the altar, and hears a voice declaring that Zacharias has been murdered and that his blood shall not be wiped away until his avenger shall come. The priest reports what he has seen to his fellows, and then (24, 3) these words follow:

καὶ τολμήσαντες εἰσῆλθον καὶ εἶδον τὸ γεγονός, καὶ τὰ φατνώματα τοῦ ναοῦ ὠλόλυξαν, καὶ αὐτοὶ περιεσχίσαντο ἀπὸ ἄνωθεν ἕως κάτω. καὶ τὸ σῶμα αὐτοῦ οὐχ εὗρον, ἀλλ' εὗρον τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ λίθον γεγενημένον.

Although the manuscripts used by modern editors (no critical edition has been made) all read *καὶ αὐτοὶ περιεσχίσαντο*, referring to the priests, the texts printed in Neander's *editio princeps* (1564) and that translated by Postel (1552) read *αὐτὰ δὲ περιεσχίσαντο*, which must be referred to *τὰ φατνώματα*.

[20] I have included the last sentence in the quotation because it lends some support to the view that Melito's words *ἐβρόντησεν . . . ἔδωκεν φωνήν* are an imaginative development from the Gospel story of the earthquake and the splitting of the rocks.

here is a slight difficulty here, especially with regard to ἀπὸ ὑψοθεν εἰς κάτω, since φάτνωμα is usually a ceiling-panel (*lacunar*) ather than a panel in a wall; but an inexact use of the word n a non-technical context is comprehensible enough. On the ther hand αὐτὰ δὲ περιεσχίσαντο is in harmony with τὰ φατνώματα ὠλόλυξαν, and may be the original text, αὐτοί representing n early correction made by a reader who knew that in ordinary language περιεσχίσαντο was said of persons rather than hings.[21] In any case the text that read αὐτά δέ may be added o the cases of "pathetic fallacy" connected with temple ortents.

Looking back over these passages, we find that they fall into hree groups:

1. Those that represent the rending of the veil as an act of he temple itself, personified and protesting against the crime f the crucifixion. Here we have the passages from Proclus nd that from the Clementine Recognitions. In the passage rom the Testament of Levi the personification is not clear, nd can be inferred only from the purpose implied in the ὥστε ause. In the Protevangelium the personification of the temle structure is clear, but the veil is not in question and the time not that of the crucifixion; however, there is little doubt that he passage has been influenced by Matt. 27, 51.

2. Those that represent the angel as tearing the veil in larm or grief, or as a token that the place is no longer holy, nd departing from the temple. Here we have Tertullian, lexander, Pseudo-Cyprian, Hilary, and the Testament of enjamin, except that the last names the Spirit of God, rather han the angel, as departing and going over to the Gentiles. erome simply takes the rending of the veil, which he does not scribe to the angel, as a token that the holy things of the anctuary now belong to the Gentiles.

3. Melito stands alone in that he implies that the veil was nt by the grief-stricken angel, yet does not mention the angel's ight from the temple. It is likely that he knew of it, but mitted express mention of it for reasons of rhetorical economy.

[21] See Amann's note in his edition of the Protevangelium.

In our passage he is concerned only with the contrast between the sympathy of nature and of supramundane beings on the one side, and the apathy of the Chosen People on the other; the desertion of the sanctuary is another theme, which need not be developed. Although Melito gives us the oldest testimony to the part played by the angel, there is no reason to think that an idea so evidently popular in origin owes its dissemination in any large measure to the influence of his homily.

We may now consider briefly the ultimate origin of the story of the angel rending the curtain and leaving the temple. Nothing is better attested in the history of religions than the belief that an injury to a temple, an image, or anything belonging to a deity is a bad omen, betokening divine displeasure; [22] and that displeasure is given powerful expression when the deity forsakes the shrine where men have been wont to worship him. The rending of the veil, which destroys a barrier between what is holy and what is profane, is equivalent to emptying the sanctuary of the divine presence. As H. Laible puts it,[23] "Der zerrissene Vorhang sah nicht anders aus, als ob das Allerheiligste aufgehört habe, Wohnung der Schechina zu sein, und als ob es vorbei sei mit dem auf dem Unterschied des Heiligen und Allerheiligsten beruhenden Tempeldienst." [24]

That impression of the story has naturally led to a discussion of the question which curtain is meant, that before the Holy Place or that before the Holy of Holies. Zahn accepted the former view, which agrees with a combination which he makes, and to which he attaches some historical value, between the narrative of the canonical Gospels, that about the broken lintel, from the Gospel of the Hebrews, and the story told in Josephus and by some Talmudic writers, about the spontane-

[22] For a single example, which bears a certain resemblance to the Gospel story, compare the story cited by Wetstein in his note on Matt. 27, 51 about the splitting of the peplos, upon which the servile Athenians had had representations of Demetrius embroidered along with those of Athena and Zeus; Plut. Dem. 12.

[23] Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift, XXXV (1924), 306.

[24] The rabbinical doctrine (Bab. Yoma 21b, Goldschmidt's translation, III, 53; Jer. Taanith, 2, 1, Maccoth 2, 6; Schwab's translation, VI, 153, XI, 90) that the Shechinah, though present in the tabernacle and the first temple, was lacking in the second temple (and *a fortiori* in the temple of Herod?) was probably not consistently held.

is opening of the heavy doors of the temple.[25] Laible [26] holds hat the veil was that of the Holy of Holies, and the same view taken by Strack and Billerbeck [27] in their note on Matt. 27, 1. This is not the place for further discussion of that problem; ut the whole tendency of the story about the rent veil — pro-st against the slaying of the Messiah, final rejection of Israel - points to the veil of the Holy of Holies, the ancient sanctity which is thus symbolically destroyed.

If this interpretation is right, it implies the presence of an ngel in the most holy place of the temple; and I know of no ther direct testimony to the existence of such an idea. The ngel that appeared to Zacharias (Luke 1, 11) was seen at the ght of the altar of incense, in the Holy Place; Luke does not ay that he came from the Holy of Holies. But we should per-aps remember that the word *angel*, while ordinarily denoting messenger or minister of God, is sometimes, at least in earlier Hebrew literature, an evasive expression for God himself;[28] nd, since in Test. Benj. 9 it is "the Spirit of God" that is to ave the temple after the veil is rent, we can see that *angel* ay merely represent an anthropomorphic conception of the ivine essence.[29] It is a curious fact that when Eusebius has ccasion to say that the veil of the temple was rent at the rucifixion,[30] he adds ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Ἰώσηπος ἱστορεῖ γεγονέναι κατὰ τοὺς Ὀζίου χρόνους. But what Josephus says [31] is that there was violent earthquake, καὶ διαστάντος τοῦ ναοῦ φέγγος ἡλίου λαμπρὸν ἐξέλαμψε καὶ τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως ὄψει προσέπεσεν, and made him prous because he had presumed to offer sacrifice like a priest.

[25] Th. Zahn, in Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift, XIII (1902), 729–756; Joseph. Bell. id. 6, 293–295. The pertinent passages from the Talmud (Jer. Yoma 43 c ad fin., ab. Yoma 39 b) are cited by Zahn, pp. 740–741. — The question about the two veils as debated by Origen (on Matt., Comm. Ser. 138; Berlin ed., Vol. XI, 285–6), who ecided in favor of the outer veil, chiefly because that view fits better with his "inner" terpretation of the happening. Jerome ep. 120 (to Hedybia) follows Origen.

[26] Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift, XXXV (1924), 287–314.

[27] Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch.

[28] So G. A. Barton, in Hastings ERE IV, 594–5; he finds (p. 596b) an example as te as Eccl. 5, 6.

[29] For the idea of the Holy Spirit deserting Israel, compare the Midrashic inter-retation of Eccl. 12, 7 (Midrasch Kohelet, p. 157 ed. Wünsche).

[30] Dem. Evang. 6, 18, 41.

[31] Ant. 9, 225.

To Eusebius, it would seem, the parting of the veil of the temple, whence (as other writers said) something holy had fled, was like the rift which permitted an unbearable light (the Shechinah?) to escape and strike the face of the sacrilegious King Uzziah.[32]

Jewish legends mention various apparitions and voices which show clearly enough that anthropomorphic conceptions of the Deity constantly asserted themselves,[33] even in connection with the holiest places. Among the most striking of these are the story that Titus pierced the veil with his sword, which drew blood from it,[34] Josephus' account of the voice heard by John Hyrkanos, telling him of the victory of his sons,[35] and, most impressive of all, the portents that foreshadowed the fall of Jerusalem — the noise and movements heard by the priests when they were within the temple, and the voices saying "Let us go hence."[36] Such legends teach us to understand the growth and the spread of the beliefs about the angel's flight from the temple.

The following passage seems to be relevant to the foregoing discussion, in so far as it implies a belief in an angel dwelling in the sanctuary:

M. Gaster, The Samaritans (London, 1925), p. 78. 'The Samaritans did not ascribe to angels any power whatsoever of good or evil. Their belief in them was, no doubt, limited to the few allusions in the Pentateuch, for they do not deny what is expressly stated in it, and therefore believe in angels as messengers of God; they know two or three, and speak of a fourth, whom they call Kebalai, a word which has hitherto puzzled all who have studied Samaritan doctrines, although the origin of this name is perfectly simple. It is a word which occurs in Num. iv. 20, where it says: 'They shall not enter the sanctuary lest they see the "covering up" of the Holy of Holies and die.' Now the Samaritans . . . translate the verse: 'lest they see Kebalai within the sanctuary and die.' The word Kebalai 'is a hapaxlegomenon, and was therefore misunderstood by them;' thus a new angel was created.'

(A. D. N.)

[32] One inclines to read λαμπρότερον in Josephus' text, or else to omit ἡλίου, as Eusebius does when he quotes the passage.

[33] See Strack-Billerbeck, II, 78–79, on Luke 1, 11.

[34] Midrasch Bereshith Rabba Par. X, Ch. 2, 1 (p. 42 Wünsche); Bab. Gittin 56 b (tr. Goldschmidt, VI, 366–7).

[35] Joseph. Ant. 13, 282.

[36] Bell. Jud. 6, 299.